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Abstract
This Comment argues that the APL will help transform Japan’s informal regulatory style into
a market-based regulatory structure that will foster improved efficiency and other benefits asso-
ciated with market-based regulations. Part I discusses the development of informal administra-
tive decision-making methods within Japan, analyzes the lack of judicial review of administrative
guidance, and examines the process of administrative guidance. Part I also examines the factors
that contributed to the enactment of the APL, to both limit and refine the administrative guidance
process. Part II discusses the APL in light of the previous procedural inadequacies of the admin-
istrative guidance process, highlights new procedural guidelines promulgated by the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (“MITI”) and the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”), and analyzes
these ministries’ compliance with the APL. Part III argues that the APL is a positive first step to-
wards the establishment of fair and transparent administrative processes in Japan. This Comment
concludes that, despite the APL’s weaknesses, growing business conviction and the declining in-
fluence of Japan’s regulatory agencies will supplement the impact of the APL in pushing Japan
towards a market-driven regulatory system.
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NOW THAT THE FOG HAS LIFTED: THE IMPACT OF
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INTRODUCTION
The non-transparent' and anti-competitive2  regulatory
methods of Japan's economic bureaucracy 3 impede new entrants
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University. The 1995 MCI-Fordham
International Law Fellowship generously funded the research for this Comment.
Special thanks to Professor Whitmore Gray for academic and operatic influences,
Professor Frank Upham, Toru Matsumoto, and Professor Mark Levin for their helpful
suggestions, and Professor Katsuya Uga for his English language translation of the
Administrative Procedures Law ("APL") prepared for the Management and
Coordination Agency ("MCA").
1. Peter B. Edelman, Japanese Product Standards as Non-taiff Trade Barriers: When
Regulatory Policy Becomes a Trade Issue, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389 (1988). Edelman con-
tends that:
[T]he system lacks 'transparency': the drafting and application of standards
are frequently so inaccessible that foreign firms can affect neither their con-
tent nor implementation. These conditions have led foreigners to charge that
the standards are systematically used as trade barriers, and to press for changes
to the regulatory process.
Id. at 390; Masu Uekusa, Government Regulations in Japan: Toward Their International Har-
monization and Integration, in JAPAN'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE? 237
(Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990); MUNEYUKI SHINDO, GYoSEI SHIDO [ADMINISTRATIVE GuI-
DANCE] 17 (1994) (detailing U.S. criticism in SII Talks ofJapan's non-transparent regu-
latory procedures). Transparency is defined as clarity in the contents of intended ad-
ministrative determinations. KATSUYA UGA, GYosEI TETSUZUKI Ho NO RIRON [THE THE-
ORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAw], 17 (1995) [hereinafter APL THEORY]. The
non-transparency of administrative guidance in Japan is cited as a non-tariff barrier.
MASASHI KANEKO, GYOSEI TETSUZURI Ho 1-2 (1995).
2. Edelman, supra note 1, at 389-90 (discussing foreign criticism ofJapanese regu-
latory standards as non-tariff barriers that prevent or impede competition); KANEKO,
supra note 1, at 1-2 (discussing Structural Impediments Initiative Talks ("SII Talks") and
claims thatJapan's regulatory system lacks transparency and constitutes non-tariff bar-
rier).
3. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 13-18 (detailing control of Ministry of Finance
("MOF"), and Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI") over Japanese
economy as illustrated in famous uses of administrative guidance since 1980's); SHINDO,
supra note 1, at 90 (discussing prevalence of administrative guidance by MITI, MOF,
and Ministry of Transport ("MOT") in regulating economic activities in Japan); see
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to Japanese markets.4 Japan's regulatory system emphasizes
close, informal contacts between the regulators and the firms
they regulate.' Gyosei shido, or administrative guidance, the pro-
cess by which ministries use implied threats of future action' or
inaction' in seeking a party's compliance with an administrative
goal, is the primary regulatory method in Japan.' Japan's infor-
mal style of regulatory governance, including administrative gui-
dance, evolved from informal means of governance in Japanese
history.9 The Japanese legal system 1" and other institutional ar-
Eamonn Fingleton, Japan's Invisible Leviathan, FOR. Air., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 69, 70-73
(discussing breadth of MOF's influence over economy). Two ministries, MITI and the
MOF, regulate a large part of the Japanese economy. SINDO, supra note 1, at 90-91.
4. Gaishikei Kigyo 'Bijinesu Konnan' 52% [Fifty-two Percent of Foreign Firms Find Doing
Business in Japan Difficult'], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Nov. 20, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter Doing
Business in Japan] (reporting that 92% of foreign firms cite regulations, laws, and ad-
ministrative guidance as reasons for their competitive difficulties in doing business in
Japan); Edelman, supra note 1, at 389 (discussing application criteria and product li-
censing standards as barriers to market entry in Japan).
5. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POST WAR JAPAN 166-68 (1987)
[hereinafter LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE] (discussing influence of informality on coopera-
tive government-business relations).
6. See KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE-ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER 450 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER] (discussing leverage ministries have over companies by
choosing to act or refrain from acting in order to compel compliance with administra-
tive guidance).
7. David Boling, Administrative Procedure Law Makes Inroads on Bureaucracy But Leaves
Web Largely Intact, E. AsLAN EXEC. REP., July 15, 1994, at 7, 16. '"Bureaucracies derive
much of their power from simple inaction - for examplejust sitting on an application
for a permit until the applicant alters his behavior to comport with the ministry's
desires." Id. at 16. See ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing
leverage ministries have over companies by choosing to act or refrain from acting in
order to compel compliance with administrative guidance).
8. Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 60
(1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW] (describing administrative guidance
as core around which regulatory system in Japan is centered); see Stephen M. Spaeth,
Industrial Policy, Continuing Surveillance, and Raised Eyebrows: A Comparison of Informality in
Administrative Procedure in Japan and the United States, 20 OHIO N.U. L. RE,%. 931, 933
(1994) (noting that most MITI policy directives are put into effect by use of administra-
tive guidance).
9. CYRIL E. BLACK ET AL., THE MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN AND RUSSIA 50 (1975); see
KENT E. CALDER, CRISIS AND COMPENSATION: PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN
JAPAN, 1949-1986, at 141-42 (1988) [hereinafter CRISIS AND COMPENSATION] (discussing
power of 19th century Japanese administrative state). Bureaucratic power was en-
hanced by a traditional political culture that emphasized respect for "scholarly men of
affairs." Id. Neo-Confucian traditions in seventeenth century Tokugawa Japan
strengthened bureaucratic power and continued to be influential later in Japanese his-
tory. Id.
10. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing prevalence of infor-
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rangements, like the amakudari system 1 and the shingikai coun-
cils, 1 2 which emphasize close, informal ties between government
and business, perpetuate Japan's informal regulatory system and
enhance compliance with administrative guidance.' 3
Responding to criticism14 of Japan's regulatory practices
and the shift ofJapan's industrial base overseas, 15Japan enacted
mal means of regulation via ministries' broad statutory authority and lack of judicial
review of ministerial action).
11. Id. at 167. Literally defined as "descent from heaven," amakudari refers to for-
mer bureaucrats descending from the ministry after retirement into the ranks of one of
the companies that the ministry is responsible for regulating. Id.
12. Id. at 168. Defined as "deliberation councils," the use of shingikai is an infor-
mal process by which the government sets and implements industrial policy with the
constant participation of industry. Id. Shingikai are composed of academics, business
representatives, consumer group representatives, political figures, and bureaucrats. Id.
13. Id. at 168-69. Informality in industrial policy begins with the formulation of
policy and continues throughout its implementation. Id. at 168. In focusing on MITI's
use of administrative guidance, one commentator notes that:
Even in areas where it has specific legal power, MITI rarely exercises it for-
mally. Instead it prefers to use various informal, legally voluntary modes of
persuasion, generically known as administrative guidance, to convince individ-
ual firms or groups of firms to comply with Ministry policy... What is interest-
ing aboutJapanese industrial policy is the degree to which MITI gains compli-
ance in areas where it has broad, jurisdictional competence but no specific
statutory authority. Part of the explanation lies in the interlocking interests of
the government-business relationship ....
Id. at 168-69; ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450-51. "For the bureaucrats,
it is very important that an illusion of voluntary co-operation be maintained, so officials
nearly always prefer to approach a potentially recalcitrant company informally, and of-
fer it freedom from 'red tape' in return for compliance ... even where there is a law
regulating the issue at hand." Id.
14. Doing Business in Japan, supra note 4, at 6 (citingJapanese regulatory practices
as main difficulty of doing business in Japan); Seishi Shibaita & Hiroshi Fukuei, Gyosei
nofutomeisa ga shinrai o ushinau [The Administration's Lack of Transparency Leads to a Loss of
Confidence], SHUKAN Tovo KIz, May 26, 1990, at 4 (blaming bureaucratic regulations
and lack of transparency in administrative processes for declining confidence in Japa-
nese business and financial markets).
15. Prepared statement of Kent E. Calder Before the House Committee on Bank-
ing and Financial Services (Oct, 16, 1995), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Calder Testimony]. "[I]n a borderless global economy,
continued overregulation will increasingly provoke both multinational and increasingly
even some Japanese firms to bypassJapan, and to migrate elsewhere - a prospect that
should exert its own unremitting pressure for reform." Id.; Prepared statement of Merit
E.Janow Before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International
Relations (Oct. 30, 1995), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CURNWS File [hereinaf-
terJanow Testimony]. "Market-based and other pressures are chipping away at barriers
and are resulting in a relatively more open and incrementally changing Japanese econ-
omy." Id. There are long-term political and economic forces pushing Japan towards a
deregulated, market-driven economy. Calder Testimony, supra.
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the Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho, or Administrative Procedures Lawt6
("APL") on November 12, 1993.17 The design of the APL is to
clarify regulatory procedures in Japan by promulgating uniform
rules regarding government procedures 18 for applications, 9 dis-
positions,2" administrative guidance,2" and notifications.22 The
APL's enactment embodies Japan's efforts to formalize regula-
tory processes and remove impediments to open markets in Ja-
pan. 23
This Comment argues that the APL will help transform Ja-
16. Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho [Administrative Procedure Law], Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan)
[hereinafter APL].
17. Katsuya Uga, Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho ni Tsuite [Concerning the Administrative Proce-
dures Law], KIKAN GYOSEI KANRI KENKYU [ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH QUAR-
TERLY], Mar. 1994, at 41 [hereinafter Concerning the APL].
18. APL art. 1 (1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). In relevant part, Article I stipulates
that:
This law concerning procedures for dispositions, administrative guidance, and
notifications, and providing for universality for matters relating to such ac-
tions, seeks to advance a guarantee of fairness and progress towards trans-
parency (here meaning, that there be clarity in the public understanding of
the contents and processes of administrative determinations ... ) in adminis-
trative process, and thereby to promote the protection of the rights and inter-
ests of the public.
Id.; see Toshimichi Yagi; Ima, Naze 'Kiseikanwa' ka IWhy deregulate now?], KiKRAN GYoSEI
KANRI KENKYU [ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH QUARTERLY], Sep. 1994, at 3
(discussing APL's purpose and scope of application); Making Government More Transpar-
ent, DMLY YOMIURI, Nov. 16, 1993, at 6 (citing application of APL to all applications,
dispositions, and administrative guidance).
19. APL art. 2(3), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). "Applications refer to requests,
made pursuant to Statutes, for permission, authorization, license, or some other Dispo-
sition by an administrative agency granting some benefit to the applicant.., and to
which requests the administrative agencies should respond in the affirmative or nega -
tive." Id.
20. Id. art. 2(2). "Dispositions refer to the rendering of dispositions and other acts
involving the exercise of public authority by administrative agencies." Id. The APL
specifically addresses adverse dispositions which "refer to Dispositions in which adminis-
trative agencies, acting pursuant to Statutes, designate specified persons as subject par-
ties to the Disposition and directly impose duties upon them or limit their rights ......
Id.
21. Id. art 2(6). Administrative Guidance refers to "guidance, recommendations,
advice, or other acts by which an Administrative Organ may seek, within the scope of its
duties or designated functions, certain feasance or non-feasance on the part of specifies
persons in order to realize administrative aims, where such acts are not Dispositions."
Id.
22. Id. art. 2(7). Notifications are "actions taken to notify administrative agencies
of given matters (excluding applications) as may be expressly obligated by Statutes (in-
cluding those notification which become necessary by virtue of being prerequisite for
bringing about some hoped-for legal effect)." Id.
23. KANEKO, supra note 1, at i-v.
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pan's informal regulatory style into a market-based regulatory
structure that will foster improved efficiency and other benefits
associated with market-based regulations. Part I discusses the de-
velopment of informal administrative decision-making methods
within Japan, analyzes the lack of judicial review of administra-
tive guidance, and examines the process of administrative gui-
dance. Part I also examines the factors that contributed to the
enactment of the APL, to both limit and refine the administra-
tive guidance process. Part II discusses the APL in light of the
previous procedural inadequacies of the administrative guidance
process, highlights new procedural guidelines promulgated by
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 4 ("MITI") and
the Ministry of Finance "25 ("MOF"), and analyzes these minis-
tries' compliance with the APL. Part III argues that the APL is a
positive first step towards the establishment of fair and transpar-
ent administrative processes in Japan. This Comment concludes
that, despite the APL's weaknesses, growing business conviction
and the declining influence of Japan's regulatory agencies will
supplement the impact of the APL in pushing Japan towards a
market-driven regulatory system.
I. PRNCIPLES UNDERLYING JAPAN'S REGULATORY SYSTEM
MITI and MOF regulations influence, guide, and control
24. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 7-9. The organization ofJapan's
executive branch is based on the National Government Organization Law, Law No. 120
of 1947. Id. at 7. Under this law, there are the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministries,
the Commissions, and the Agencies. Id. Ministries were established by enabling stat-
utes that provide for the ministries' powers and responsibilities. Id. MITI is responsible
for:
[P]romoting and supervising industrial policy concerning manufacturing in-
dustries and small business, granting industrial property rights such as patents
through the Patent Office, licensing and regulating public utilities such as
electricity and gas through laws such as the Electricity Business Law and the
Gas Business Law, and enforcing foreign trade policy, for such things as ex-
port and import, under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law.
Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 7-9. MOF is responsible for:
[P]reparing the budget for the government, securing governmental revenue
by taxation, supervising tariffs under the Customs and Tariff Law, regulating
foreign investment and foreign exchange under the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law, and promoting and regulating such business sec-
tors as banking, insurance, and securities under the relevant laws.
Id. at 9.
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decisions made by privately-owned businesses in a manner that
would be met with resistance and legal challenge if attempted in
a country other than Japan. 6 The standard reaction to informal
requests made by Japanese ministries, however, is compliance. 7
Japanese ministries, despite existing formal statutory authority,
28
prefer to use informal and legally voluntary29 methods to achieve
compliance with their administrative goals."0
A. The Prevalence of Informality
Commentators on administrative guidance view the infor-
mality of the process as peculiar to Japan."1 The use of informal
methods of governmental control and decision-making through-
out Japan's history set the stage for the informality of Japan's
current regulatory system.12 Interlocking interests of the Gov-
26. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 166 (noting pervasiveness of infor-
mality in Japanese industrial policy and relative lack of conflict and challenge of minis-
tries' guidance).
27. ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450; see Mitsuo Matsushita, The
Legal Framework of Trade and Investment in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361, 376-77 (1986)
[hereinafter Legal Framework of Trade] (discussing general deference to ministry policy
decisions).
28. ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450-51.
29. Id. "Voluntary" means that compliance is not affected through the exercise of
formal statutory power. Id. Firms comply with bureaucratic guidance regarding sug-
gested courses of action in order to maintain good relations with the ministry and not
incur any negative repercussions for not complying with administrative guidance. Id.
In addition, "ministries dole out favours such as tax privileges and financial help in
return for obedience to administrative guidance." Id. at 451.
30. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168. Even where MITI has formal
statutory powers, it rarely exercises it. Id. MITI instead prefers to use administrative
guidance. Id.
31. John 0. Haley, Administrative Guidance versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the
Paradox of Industrial Policy, in LAW & TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 107, 109
(Gary Saxonhouse et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Paradox of Industrial Policy].
32. JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX
51 (1991) [hereinafter AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER]. The legal tradition of present-day
Japan derives from the institutions and processes of Tokugawa governance. Id. In
1603, Ieyasu Tokugawa became Shogun, and the Tokugawa family's administration at
Edo (now called Tokyo) remained the de facto seat ofJapanese government until the
Meiji Era in 1868. JANET E. HUNTER, CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MODERNJAPANESE HISTORY
228 (1984). This period represents the successful consolidation of control by the Toku-
gawa Bakufu over most ofJapan. Id. The name bakufu signifies a military government
headed by a Shogun, the emperor's military deputy. Id. The major achievements of
Tokugawa governance include:
[T]he fusion of elements of a sinicized bureaucratic tradition with the institu-
tions ofjudicial governance in a context that included a critical new element,
the semiautonomous village. In this combination we find paradigms of gov-
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ernment and private businesses33 and the legal system within
which administrative guidance operates further perpetuate the
legal informality of the Japanese regulatory system. 34
1. Historical Roots Of Informality
The origins of governmental informality date back to local
governance of village life in pre-modern Japan. On a local
level, village rule emphasized the attainment of full community
consensus.36 There was no concept of legal rights that could be
used to challenge an administrative authority.37 Neo-Con-
fucian3" influences in Japan further obstructed the development
of formal laws.39
On the national level,Japan lacked adequate judicial institu-
tions and instead relied on administrative agencies for informal
dispute resolution.4" The bureaucracy's central role in pre-mod-
ernance that help explain the peculiar contours and multifaceted paradox of
law and social control in contemporary Japan.
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra, at 51.
33. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168-69.
34. Id. at 169.
35. BLACK, supra note 9, at 50. Pre-modern refers to the period beginning with the
rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the 1600's and ending with the start of the Meiji Era
in 1868. HUNTER, supra note 32, at 126-27. This period is viewed as the beginning of
Japan's rush to modernize and catch up to the rest of the developed world. Id.
36. BLACK, supra note 9, at 50. "Each village possessed numerous 'mutual responsi-
bility units,' made up of five families each (goningumi), which further strengthened the
element of collectivity." Id.
37. Id. at 51. Customary law, not written rules, were the standards for regulating
all affairs. Id. at 51-52. "Official regulations were compiled periodically, but less as
abstract prescriptions to be applied to all behavior than as guidelines for state officials
to enforce justice in a highly personalistic manner." Id. at 52. Japan "relied more on an
ethical 'natural law' that had evolved and was interpreted by the litigants themselves" as
opposed to formal court procedures designed to fit all circumstances. Id.
38. EDWIN REISCHAUER & ALBERT M. CRAIG,JAPAN: TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION
26 (1978). A general deference to authority and a desire to maintain harmonious rela-
tions reflected Neo-confucian influences. Id. In modern Japan, these attributes cre-
ated the perception thatJapanese are obedient to the bureaucracy that governs them.
Id.
39. BLACK, supra note 9, at 51. Japan has been greatly influenced by Confucianism
throughout its history. REISCHAUER & CRAIG, supra note 38, at 26. Deference to author-
ity and obedience to the ruling bureaucracy preempted the need for formal laws. Id.
40. Id. at 52-53. The main adjudicatory functions of the Japanese Government
were carried out by administrative personnel rather than an independent judicial sys-
tem. Id. Collective responsibility prevented the collapse of the civil order under this
informal system that had no official channels of redress. Id. Formal institutions played
less significant roles than did the system of self-regulation by collective units within
premodern Japanese society. Id. at 53. Enhancing the reliance on an informal system
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ern Japan fostered a high degree of governmental control.4"
Consequently, the National Government was able to dominate
decision making processes and promote the interests of the Na-
tional Government over the interests of individual villages.4 2
Through the consistent subordination of individual and village
interests, the Japanese Government eventually developed a near
monopoly over the exercise of authority.4 3 This monopolization
of authority permitted the Government to control a substantial
portion of the Nation's commercial activity.44 The existence of a
sophisticated administrative system in Japan's early development
suggested that administrators were gaining useful managerial ex-
perience.45
Japan entered into a period of rapid modernization during
the Meiji Era.46 The style of governance during the Meiji Era
and for several generations of bureaucrats that followed was
characterized as rule by consensus.47 Citizens' deference and
loyalty to governing officials, in addition to a belief in the impor-
tance of consensual leadership continued to define Japanese so-
ciety throughout the Meiji Era.48 As the Government pushed
the nation to develop economically at the start of the Meiji Era,
the role of government became more pervasive. 9 The number
was the "mixture of Confucian and feudal emphasis on hierarchy, cooperation, and
loyalty" that made formal means of settling disputes unnecessary. Id.
41. Id. at 55. "Well before the end of... premodern eras... Japan ... had forged
a high degree of political unity and governmental control." Id.
42. Id. "To a far greater extent than the earlier modernizing states, [Japan's] gov-
ernmental organs were able to dominate intermediate interests and authorities." Id.
43. Id. at 56 (discussingJapanese Government's complete monopoly on power and
successful administering of significant portion of total national production).
44. Id. "Many of the tasks of national and local government in Japan... were the
normal functions of autonomous guilds, town corporations, or independent merchants
in Western Europe and North America." Id.
45. Id. "In the context of many newly created states of the present era it is far less
noteworthy that certain governmental functions in Japan ... were imperfectly or incom-
pletely executed than that they were indeed executed by a long maturing administrative
network." Id.
46. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 32, at 68. This period of rapid devel-
opment began in the late 1860's and continued until the early 1900's. Id. Meiji Era
leaders realized Japan's vulnerability to external forces and hurriedly sought to build
Japan into a strong, independent nation. Id.
47. BLACK, supra note 9, at 147. Formal institutions, like the Diet, or Japanese
Legislature, played a lesser role in decision making than did the "consensus of the man-
agerial elite." Id.
48. Id. at 147-48.
49. Id. at 148 (discussing spread of bureaucratic influence during Meii Era).
1693
1694 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1686
of bureaucrats needed to guide Japan's economic development
continually increased and the influence of these bureaucrats ad-
ded continuity to Japan's economic development policy.5"
Concurrent with the growth in the number of bureaucrats
was an increase in the number of supportive, like-minded indi-
viduals in industry who, like the bureaucrats, graduated from the
national universities.51 During the Meiji Era, family ties, in addi-
tion to friendship ties, formed while in attendance atJapan's na-
tional universities, developed informal working relations among
prominent industry representatives and their colleagues in the
Government.52 This resulted in a homogeneous elite across all
sectors of public and private life. 53 Japan's elite remained influ-
ential under the patronage system, where those in power distrib-
uted influential positions to friends and allies.54 The patronage
system cultivated closer relations among various levels of govern-
ment and industry in Japanese society.55
2. Modern Institutional Arrangements That Evolved From
Japan's History of Informality
Although Japan has a formal parliamentary style of demo-
cratic government, informal intermingling between business and
government interests characterizes the Japanese political sys-
50. Id. The increase of bureaucrats continued from 1860-1941. Id.; see grnerally
CHALMERSJOHNSON, MITI AND THEJAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POL-
icy, 1925-1975, at 1 (1982) [hereinafter MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE] (focusing on
continuity of industrial policy and careers of government officials who shaped policy
from pre-war period through wartime and post-WWII periods).
51. BLACK, supra note 9, at 149. The trend of bureaucratic and industrial elites
attending the same universities has continued through to the present. CLYDE V.
PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLACES: How AMERICA ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKEr THE LEAD 112
(1988). At first, Tokyo University graduates automatically qualified to become bureau-
crats. EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 144 (1981) [hereinafter
STORY OF A NATION]. Soon, however, an excess number of graduates led Japan to insti-
tute more formal criteria, such as a qualifying examination and the opening of the
process to graduates of all universities in Japan. Id. While no longer a formal require-
ment, over 90% ofJapan's civil servants are graduates of Tokyo University's Law Depart-
ment. PRESTOWrrZ, supra, at 112. Tokyo University is the most prestigious institution of
higher learning in Japan and is the end goal for individuals seeking a role in either the
bureaucratic or industrial elite. Id.; STORY OF A NATION, supra, at 144.
52. BLACK, supra note 9, at 149.
53. Id. at 149-50.
54. Id. at 150.
55. Id. Close ties and strong bonds allowed Japan's Government to exercise an
indirect influence on the economy because political and business leaders were usually
friends and allies, often in pursuit of similar interests. Id. at 173.
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tern.56 Several institutional arrangements that exist within the
Japanese Government evolved from Japan's historical roots
which emphasized informality." These institutional arrange-
ments generate much informal contact between businesses and
ministries and increase the effectiveness of administrative gui-
dance. 8 The close ties between the public and private sectors
unite the interests of government and business, and portent
harmful results5 9 for companies that challenge or ignore an
agency's guidance.6"
a. The Structure of the Modern Japanese Government
The Imperial Diet was established in 1880, making Japan
the first Asian country to institute a parliamentary government.6"
The members of the upper house, however, were all representa-
tives of the privileged class and Japan continued to be ruled by
an absolute monarchy.6" In 1946, the present Constitution was
promulgated, and a democratic system of government was
adopted.65 Japan's present system is built upon the principle of
56. See IPMS GROUP, KASUMIGASEKI DEETA HANDOBUKKU [AN INSIGHT INTO JAPAN'S
BUREAUCRACY] 8-9 (1994) (discussing prevalence of informal relations among elected
officials, businesses, and bureaucrats).
57. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 32, at 51. "For mostJapanese today
the institutions and processes of Tokugawa governance appear to define their legal
tradition." Id.; see Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Intro-
duction, 17 WORLD DEN. 1319, 1321-24 (1989) (contending that institutions that exist in
particular society are linked to that society's historical development).
58. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 167-69 (illustrating effect of informal
arrangements on effectiveness of administrative guidance). "The essential condition
for the survival of the Japanese System is continued protection of the administrator
class by keeping ... the rules governing transactions among the administrators ...
informal." ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 143. "The System is what it is by
virtue of informal relations that have no basis in the constitution, in any other laws or in
any formal rules of the ministries... or any other of the administrator institutions." Id.
59. ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450. "Although there is no legal
obligation for a business to abide by the guidance, all abide by it simply because they
want to continue to function." Id. "Government officials are responsible for approval
of applications for almost every conceivable business activity. If they do not like an
applicant, for whatever reason, they can hold off a decision on that person's applica-
tions." Id.
60. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 68-69 (arguing that businesses
foster close relationship with agencies because they fear future repercussions if they do
not comply with administrative guidance); ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at
450.
61. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the separation of powers between three branches of govern-
ment: legislative, executive, and judicial. 64  The Legislative
Branch includes the Diet, consisting of an upper and lower
house.6 5 The Diet is the sole legislative organ of the state and
the highest organ of state power, vested with such powers as
designating the Prime Minister, approving non-confidence reso-
lutions in the cabinet, passing laws, and approving the budget.66
The Prime Minister's Office and the various ministries, includ-
ing MITI and MOF, comprise the Executive Branch.67 The
Supreme Court heads the Judicial Branch, which includes sev-
eral lower levels of courts. 68 The Supreme Court is authorized to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or
official act and to nominate judges of the other courts.69
b. Ties That Bind: The Amakudari System
The amakudari,7 ° or descent from heaven, system is an insti-
tution of modern Japan that is inseparable from Japan's histori-
cal development. 1 The idea of maintaining close ties between
government and private business by using influence to provide
positions to friends and allies began in pre-modern Japan.72 Be-
cause the amakudari system cultivates close ties between govern-
ment agencies and the businesses they regulate, this arrange-
ment helps explain the successful and pervasive use of informal
regulatory methods in Japan.7" In many important industries,"
the businessmen who deal with the ministries are themselves for-
64. Id. at 20.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 110.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 143.
70. See LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 167-68 (discussing retirement of
former bureaucrats into ranks of private-sector industries their ministry formerly gov-
erned); see supra note 11 and accompanying text (defining amakudari system).
71. See BLACK, supra note 9, at 150 (describing use of patronage system to establish
close ties between government and industry).
72. Id.
73. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 167-68. Upham contends that the
amakudari system, where retiring bureaucrats shift into the private sector, has the effect
of unifying interests and smoothing relations between agencies and the firms they regu-
late. Id.
74. CHALMERSJOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE 141 (1995) [hereinafter JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?]. "[11n industries where there
are large numbers of retired bureaucrats - such as steel, petroleum, electric power,
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mer bureaucrats. 75  Relations between businesses and the bu-
reaucracy are closer in industries that employ amakudari bureau-
crats, than in industries that do not hire amakudari bureau-
crats.76
Upon retirement, bureaucrats obtain one of three types of'
post-ministry employment: (1) in a private enterprise; (2) in a
public corporation or special legal entity, established by law and
funded with public money; or (3) in politics, called position ex-
ploitation, where former bureaucrats use their influence and
gain political office.77 Every year, between two hundred and
three hundred former bureaucrats retire into senior positions in
the firms they once regulated. 78 A Government report released
in 1974 showed MOF and MITI ranked first and second, respec-
tively, for total amakudari.79 This trend continues as MITI and
MOF placement of retired bureaucrats constitute a majority of
the total amakudari in the 1990's. 80 MITI amakudari descend
into the steel, electric power, petroleum, and automobile indus-
tries,81 while MOF officials retire into banking and politics.82
The retirement age for government bureaucrats is fifty-five
and, therefore, many of the former bureaucrats have another
ten to twenty active years in which to help smooth relations be-
tween the government and business.83 A continuity of interests
among bureaucratic and industrial elites binds the government-
and banking - there is much more 'government-business consensus' than in industries
where such relations do not exist." Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. (discussing closer ties between firms and bureaucracy in industries
which employ former bureaucrats than in industries that do not employ former bureau-
crats). Important industries, such as steel, petroleum, electric power, and banking, em-
ploy many retired bureaucrats and maintain close ties to the regulating ministries. Id.
77. Id. at 142.
78. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 8-9; ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at
59. Statistics for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 show that MOF and MITI amakudari com-
bined for nearly half of the total amakudari including those from 22 other government
agencies. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 8-9.
79. JAPAN: WHo GOVERNS?, supra note 74, at 144.
80. Fewer Ex-Bureaucrats Take Private Posts, NIKEl WKL'., Apr. 1, 1996, at 2; see IPMS
GROUP, supra note 56, at 8-9 (discussing MITI and MOF as top two sources of amakudari
officials despite decrease in overall number of former bureaucrats entering ranks of
private businesses).
81. JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 74, at 145.
82. Id.
83. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 8-9; EzRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN As No. 1: LESSONS
FOR AMERICA 74-75 (1979) (discussing utility of employing former MITI officials to facil-
itate communication between MITI and companies).
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business relationship together.84 Former bureaucrats admit that
agencies create tokushu hojin, or special corporations,8 5 to ex-
pand the agencies' jurisdiction and to provide employment for
retired officials.86  In addition, retired senior ranking bureau-
crats serve as senior executives in nearly all public enterprises in
Japan.87
Because Japan was subject to much governmental control in
the 1950's,88 many firms actively sought amakudari to help gain
access to bureaucrats in charge of licensing, approvals, and in-
vestment funds s.8  Resistance to amakudari grew in the 1960's
and 1970's, and today commentators foresee decreases in corpo-
rate acceptance of retiring bureaucrats into upper tier corporate
positions.9 Decreases in corporate profits and the financial
drain of hiring high-salaried amakudari, often at the expense of
younger workers, bolsters corporate resistance to the amakudari
system.9 1 Moreover, because Japanese companies are now sub-
84. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 167. The resulting effect of the
amakudari system is an "identity of views between government and business that arises
imperceptibly not only from the bureaucrats' self-interest, but also from the fact that
the Ministry views some industries as partially its own creation." Id. at 167-68.
85. JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS, supra note 74, at 134. The Government creates these
corporations by special law to serve as instruments for state activities. IPMS GROUP,
supra note 56, at 54. The establishment of a special corporation involves strict legisla-
tive control, and also must gain the approval of MOF and the Management and Coordi-
nation Agency. Id.
86. Id. The number of special corporations has grown continually from the end of
WWII. Id. at 137. In 1946, there were six special corporations and in 1972 the number
grew to 113, with 1968 the only year showing a decrease from the previous year. Id.
Active-duty bureaucrats receive praise for thinking up new ways to create special corpo-
rations and generate parliamentary support. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 137.
88. Id. at 151. "During the 1950s, when the Japanese economy was still subject to
strict governmental controls, many firms sought out and welcomed retired bureaucrats
as a means of improving their access to official agencies where critical approvals, import
and export licenses, and investment funds were obtained." Id.
89. Id. at 151. The main benefit of accepting former ministry officials was and
continues to be the officials' knowledge of the licensing approval system. Id. at 154. If
an industry is receiving administrative guidance it is beneficial to accept several
amakudari into the ranks of the business. Id. Commentators believe that ministries
benefit from this relationship and actively seek placement of their retiring officials be-
cause the amakudari system enhances compliance with administrative guidance. Id.
90. Id. at 154; Telephone Interview with Robert Radin, General Counsel, CS First
Boston, Tokyo, Japan (July 1995) [hereinafter Radin]; Benjamin Fulford, Anger Buffets
Mandarins' Golden Parachutes, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 25, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Golden
Parachutes] (discussing growth of public criticism of amakudai system in wake of recent
scandal involving housing loan corporations and retired MOF officials).
91. Radin, supra note 90.
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ject to shareholder liability, businesses are less apt to employ
highly-paid retiring bureaucrats at the expense of profitability.92
In March 1996, the amakudari system came under heavy criticism
in the wake of a scandal involving retired MOF officials serving
as executives in Japan's jusen,93 or housing loan companies.94
MOF reports plans to strengthen laws concerning the entry of
retiring bureaucrats into the private sector.95
c. The Shingikai Process
Government policy is made and instituted through constant
interaction with the private sector.96 Ministries create sh-
ingikai,97 or deliberative councils, to investigate some problem,
draft legislation to deal with the problem, or recommend alter-
native means of dealing with the problem. 98 The goal of this
system is to gather expert opinions and provide an open forum
from which recommendations for appropriate actions emerge.99
92. Id. Mr. Radin noted that MOF typically pressures healthy finance firms to buy
up ailing firms in order to prevent financial institutions from failing. Id. Japanese com-
panies are now, however, liable to shareholder lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duties
and are, therefore, less likely to buy up shares in failing and unprofitable companies.
Id. In addition, firms are fighting the amakudari system because they can no longer
afford to hire highly paid former MOF officials at the expense of younger, less expen-
sive workers. Id. Firms complain of having to force their own employees into early
retirement or forego hiring new employees because of the economic drain of employ-
ing highly-paid former bureaucrats in executive positions. Id.
93. Jathon Sapsford, Japan Tries to Stem Anger Over Bailout of Financial Firms, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A9 [hereinafter Bailout of Financial Firms]. Jusen are home mort-
gage companies. Id. MOF has received a lot of criticism for its handling of the bad-
debt crisis caused by the bankruptcy of seven jusen. Benjamin Fulford, Ministry Wants to
Craft Its Own Reforms, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 4, 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Ministry Reforms].
94. Stricter Rules Planned On Amakudari, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 11, 1996, at 2.
95. Id. MOF plans to extend from two years to five years the length of the effective
ban on retired MOF officials working for private companies they previously regulated.
Id. Japanese law stipulates that a retired government official cannot accept employ-
ment by a profit-making company in the private sector that has close ties with the offi-
cial's former ministry for two years after retirement from the bureaucracy. IPMS
GROUP, supra note 56, at 8. Such a move is acceptable if approved by the National
Personnel Authority, an office of the Government. Id.
96. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168.
97. Id. at 168; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (defining shingikai deliber-
ation councils).
98. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168; see MITI AND THEJAPANESE MIRA-
CLE, supra note 50, at 47-48 (discussing bureaucratic domination of law making and use
of shingikai, or deliberation councils).
99. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 199. The reality is, however, that
shingikai rarely serve their designed purpose because of bureaucratic domination of the
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Bureaucrats frequently, however, use shingikai to diminish op-
portunities for open conflict in policy adjustments that are likely
to face stiff opposition with either the public or the Diet.'
Deliberation councils usually consist of scholars, journalists,
business representatives, and representatives of interest groups
specifically affected by a policy.' 01 Ministry bureaucrats and in-
dustry representatives, however, constitute the largest part of the
council.' 2 The focal point of shingikai is to achieve consen-
sus.' 03 Participation by some of Japan's top academics and
thinkers in the resulting consensus alleviates criticism that the
use of shingikai to make public policy is undemocratic.10 4
d. Structural Corruption: The Iron Triangle
The Iron Triangle,0 5 made up of politicians, bureaucrats,
and businesses, is the traditional structure of the political system
in Japan.' 06 This arrangement owes its strength to the tangling
of interests that resulted from a long period of one-party rule by
the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP").1 °7 The LDP's elected of-
process. Id. The true role of shingikai has been "to legitimate policy made elsewhere."
Id.
100. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 191. Shingikai are often used by
Japanese bureaucrats to reduce or eliminate opposition to their plans. Id. at 201.
101. Id. at 191.
102. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168.
103. Id. Opinions are usually influenced by bureaucrats who also participate in
the council, so the end result is a consensus that reflects the opinion of the bureaucrats.
Id. Industry trade associations generally play the part of a shingikai. Id. "In the weeks
between formal meetings of the council, Ministry bureaucrats and trade association
members are in constant contact in order to ensure that, by the time the council for-
mally convenes, the substantive questions will have been settled." Id.
104. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 444. Shingikai gather representa-
tives of those concerned with the particular issue and make them a party to the consen-
sus opinion that emanates from these councils. Id. "Occasionally they [shingikai] may
evolve a fresh - or a first - approach to a pressing issue, but mostly they are symbolic
expressions of 'consensus', a proof that the public has been served by having a variety of
the best minds thoroughly mull over a course of action." Id.
105. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 5 (discussing system of influence peddling
between politicians, businesses, and bureaucrats as "Iron Triangle").
106. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 14; IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 5;
see ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 173-77 (discussing influence and open-
ness of Japan's "money politics").
107. Nobuhito Kishi, Ministiy of Ministries: Leader of Japan's Bureaucracy Rushes to
Keep Up With Current of Change, By THE WAY, July/Aug. 1994, at 47. Japan experienced
political stability for nearly 40 years in the Post-WWII period under the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party ("LDP"). IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 2. After a series of political scan-
dals involving LDP members and the LDP's inability to carry out political reform, the
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ficials occupied a position above the bureaucrats, who regulate
industry via permits, licenses, and guidance. 10 8 Businesses en-
sured their role in the Iron Triangle by making political contri-
butions and stressing their ability to deliver voting blocs.109
The interplay of these differing interests and influences
generate a system of give and take, where businesses, hoping to
circumvent some legal requirement, offer money to politi-
cians.110 The politicians exert political pressure and lobby on
behalf of the business by pressuring the agency to grant certifica-
tion or other special treatment.' Common examples include:
granting of permission to do business despite lacking qualifica-
tions or failing to meet the statutory requirements, 1 2 issuing a
license to do business without proper examination of the appli-
cation," 3 and generally overlooking serious legal violations." 4
e. The MOF-Tan Network: Brokers As Intermediaries
Japanese banks and securities companies station permanent
employees at MOF to obtain information from MOF bureau-
crats.115 These employees, nicknamed MOF-Tans, 116 are respon-
sible for culling information from ranking MOF bureaucrats re-
garding inspections of banks or MOF's position on a particular
new product or service." 7 Stationed at the Banking Bureau" 8
Diet passed a non confidence resolution and dissolved the cabinet in 1993. Id. The
LDP failed to maintain its majority hold, and eventually a coalition government, led by
Prime Minister Hosokawa, was inaugurated in August 1993. Id.
108. Kishi, supra note 107, at 47.
109. Id.
110. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 5.
111. Id. The collapse in 1993 of strong one-party rule led to a diminution of politi-
cian's influence over the bureaucracy and a commensurate increase in the bureau-
cracy's power. Kishi, supra note 107, at 49. Political rule via coalition governments
since the early 1990's created a power void that the bureaucracy, particularly MOF,
filled. Id.
112. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Yutsuna Pawaa Okurasho [Ministry of Finance- Power Down in the Dumps], AsA-I
SHIMBUN, Apr. 4, 1995, at 11 [hereinafter Power Down in the Dumps]; see SHINDO, supra
note 1, at 8, 106-07 (describing types of information garnered from MOF officials by
MOF-Tans, employees of banking and securities firms permanently stationed at MOF).
116. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 107. The full name is Okurasho Tanto Shain, or work-
ers responsible for relations with MOF. Id.
117. Power Down in the Dumps, supra note 115, at 11. The MOF-Tan's job begins
after normal working hours, when they invite MOF officials to traditional Japanese res-
taurants to find out times for ministerial approval of new products or services, or to
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and Securities Bureau,119 MOF-Tans' role includes following the
Bureau's movements and obtaining opinions on matters impor-
tant to the company.1 20 Banks and securities companies utilize
MOF-Tans to maintain close ties to MOF. 12 1
MOF-Tans receive a salary from their own company, but
spend all day at MOF.122 During busy periods for MOF, MOF-
Tans lend assistance by doing work for MOF, however, their pri-
mary job is to obtain information regarding upcoming inspec-
tions of financial institutions. 123  MOF-Tans sometimes assist
MOF in implementing administrative guidance by helping en-
sure smooth implementation.1 2 4
The MOF-Tan system, under public and media pressure,
was reformed because of excesses 2 5 revealed in 1995.126 Since
the 1995 reform, there are few examples of lavish entertainment
of MOF officials by financial institutions. 127 As financial liberali-
zation progresses and MOF's approval and certification systems
become less arbitrary, the need for and position of MOF-Tans
are diminishing.1 21 MOF-Tans also face increasing antagonism
from fellow employees as the finance industry struggles to cut
obtain information that will help set the company's management strategy. Id. A mem-
ber of this elite network revealed that he entertained ranking MOF officials two to three
times per week with a typical evening running US$300-400 per person. Id. This is not
considered extravagant because important information can be obtained, like when an
on-the-spot inspection will be carried out or at which branch the inspection will take
place. Id.
118. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 37-38. The MOF is divided into several inter-
nal bureaus including the Banking Bureau. Id. MOF's Banking Bureau is responsible
for regulating Japan's banking industry. Id. at 37.
119. Id. MOF's Securities Bureau regulates activity in Japan's capital markets. Id.
120. Power Down in the Dumps, supra note 115, at 11.
121. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 8 (describing influential role of MOF-Tans in 1991
Securities Compensation Scandal involving financial institutions).
122. TOMONOBU OMIYA, KEIZAI TO GYOSEI NO KANKEI.GA HITOSUME DE WAKARU JITEN
[INCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS] 84 (1993).
123. Id. If MOF-Tans are able to gather such information, the banks or securities
firms can adapt their policies to hide any legal defects in business operations. Id.
124. Id.
125. Power Down in the Dumps, supra note 115, at 11. Nightly entertainment costs
normally amounted US$300 to US$400 per person. Id. One employee conceded that
he spent US$600 per person when he entertained three deputy division directors of the
Banking Bureau. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. MOF is refraining from lavish activities because of criticism that MOF
maintains collusive ties to the finance industry. Id.
128. Id.
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costs and improve profitability. 29
3. Legal Structures That Perpetuate Japan's Informal
Regulatory System
The Japanese legal environment increases the effectiveness
of administrative guidance in industrial policy.'3 ° Japan's infor-
mal regulatory process functions within a legal system that con-
sists of a ministry's statutory authority limited by administrative
rules and doctrines of judicial review that are designed as a
check against arbitrary policies. 131 In Japan, courts grant minis-
tries broad discretion in their regulatory methods because of
vaguely worded statutes.'32 Combined with low levels ofjudicial
review, this broad discretionary authority insulates much of Ja-
pan's industrial policy from challenge.1 3 1
a. Broad Scope of Authority
The underlying characteristics of Japanese statutes are the
broad scope of authority provided to ministries and vague stan-
dards with which ministries are to exercise that authority.'34
Ministries' broad-based authority and uncertainty regarding
whether agencies' actions are legal improves the effectiveness of
administrative guidance.' 35 Recipients of guidance, because of
129. Id.
130. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 168-71 (discussing role of legal
system and difficulty of gainingjudicial review of administrative guidance in enhancing
compliance with guidance).
131. Id. at 169.
132. Id. (supporting broad discretion for ministries because of vague statutory
wording). For example, "[o]verriding characteristics of all statutes are the wide scope
of authority delegated to MITI and the vagueness of the standards by which MITI is to
exercise that authority." Id. "When it comes to how, when, or toward what end that
legal power should be used, most economic statutes are so broad as to be virtually
meaningless." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The wording used in Japanese statutes is vague and ambiguous. Spaeth,
supra note 8, at 937.
135. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 68; Frank K. Upham, The Legal
Framework ofJapan's Declining Industries Policy: The Problem of Transparency in Administrative
Processes, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 425, 432 (1986) [hereinafter Declining Industries Policy].
Traditionally, courts grant ministries a lot of leeway in interpreting statutory authority,
thus providing agencies with ministerial discretion in their market governance. LAw
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176. Japanese courts tend to rule in favor of an
agency's interpretation regarding the scope of their statutory authority. Declining Indus-
tries Policy, supra, at 432. Despitejudicial leeway in agencies' discretionary power, agen-
cies continue to prefer informal administrative guidance reinforced by implied threats
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the need"3 6 for close, amicable relations with bureaucrats, gener-
ally do not challenge administrative guidance. 3 7 In cases where
the recipient of guidance has no way to discern the legality of
the agencies' action, barring public challenge through litigation,
there is less incentive to jeopardize the firm's relations with the
ministry. 138
b. Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance
Japan's legal infrastructure consists of government minis-
tries, with broad statutory authority, and principles of adminis-
trative law that define the limits of that authority.1 3 9 Ministries
generally exercise their influence informally and, thus, do not
act in a way that creates legal rights for parties to challenge ad-
ministrative decisions. The prevalence of administrative gui-
dance and judicial interpretation of doctrines of justiciability,
standing, and scope of agency discretion, therefore, deny judi-
cial review of most Japanese industrial policy decisions. 4
i. Administrative Acts and Justiciability
Prior to the enactment of the APL, two statutes provided the
primary avenues for challenging administrative actions: the Ad-
of formal statutory powers in cases of non-compliance because of the speed and flexibil-
ity with which policy can be implemented. Paradox of Industrial Policy, supra note 31, at
111; see Edelman, supra note 1, at 436 (discussing bureaucrats use of informal regula-
tory methods in most circumstances, even where actual statutory authority exists).
136. Rachael Field, Japanese Cultural Trade Barriers and the Search for an Appropriate
Dispute Settlement Forum - An Australian Perspective, 21 AusTrL. Bus. L. REv. 173, 176
(1993). Non-compliance with a ministry's guidance usually translates into the denial of
certain benefits only available to firms that defer to the bureaucrats' wishes. Id.
137. Id. "[C]ompliance is virtually assured because of the pressure on the parties
not to affect the traditional authority of the bureaucracy and because non-compliance
translates into a rejection of certain benefits made available only to those who defer to
the administration." Id.
138. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 169 (discussing judicial preference
for ministries' interpretation of their scope of authority). Agencies use the implied
threat of other statutory powers that the party is subject to in order to effectuate compli-
ance with their policy. Id. To be sure, some policies implemented by agencies are
favorable to recipient parties, yet ministries continue to rely on informal guidance in
cases where the goals of the ministry and the recipient party diverge. ENIGMA OFJAPA-
NESE POWER, supra note 6, at 449-50.
139. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGCE, supra note 6, at 169.
140. Id. at 169-72; see Spaeth, supra note 8, at 937 (analyzing barriers to judicial
review of administrative actions in Japan); Edelman, supra note 1, at 394 (discussing
effect ofjudicial deference to agency discretion and narrow views of standing and jus-
ticiability in Japan).
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ministrative Case Litigation Law"' ("ACLL"), and the Adminis-
trative Complaint Inquiries Law ("ACIL").142 Despite further
supplementation in other specialized regulatory statutes, under
the above statutes, parties may only challenge actions that are
gyosei shobun, or administrative dispositions, or some other exer-
cise of public power as stipulated in Article 3143 of the ACLL.'"
If the act is a disposition or exercise of public power, the issue is
justiciable and the inquiry becomes whether the plaintiff is an
appropriate person to challenge the action.1 4 5 Judicial interpre-
tation of this issue limits application of Article 3 to acts that im-
mediately and directly create or establish boundaries of private
rights and duties.'46
The difficulty for those seeking review of an agency's gui-
dance is that the informal nature of most guidance does not con-
stitute an administrative disposition or other exercise of public
power as defined by the ACLL.' 47 A ministry's oral guidance
does not constitute a disposition or other exercise of power be-
cause it is unwritten' 48 and based on voluntary compliance. '49
141. yosei jiken sosho ho [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962
(Japan) [hereinafter ACLL]. See generally Robert W. Dzuibla, The Impotent Sword ofJapa-
nese Justice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei as a Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL.
INT'L L.J. 37 (1985) (discussing doctrine of shobunsei and litigation against administra-
tive agencies under Administrative Case Litigation Law ("ACLL")).
142. Gyoseifufuku shinsa ho [Administrative Complaint Inquiries Law], Law No. 160 of
1962 (Japan) [hereinafter ACIL].
143. ACLL art. 3, Law No. 139 of 1962 (Japan).
144. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 170-71.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 171; see Sasaki v. Atami City Agricultural Council, 9 Minshu 217 (1955)
(S. Ct.) (Japan) (holding that notice from defendant did not constitute administrative
disposition). "The effect of the Sasaki rule is that supervisory orders, permissions, ap.
provals, and regulations among agencies or within a single agency cannot be the object
of litigation because they do not directly create or form the rights and duties of citi-
zens." Dziubla, supra note 141, at 45. Therefore, it is not only informal acts that are
beyond judicial scrutiny. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANCE, supra note 5, at 171. Numerous
formal actions are beyond review because they are considered internal government be-
havior that do not directly effect the private rights or duties of private citizens. Id. The
list of internal government behavior that is beyond review includes shingikai. Id. "Thus,
even a final shingikai report that recommends specific criteria for a production or price
cartel would not be reviewable until its provisions were formally implemented, and then
only if they legally restrained private action." Id.
147. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 171. "MITI almost invariably acts
informally in a legal sense, and only a final and legally formal act directly creates legal
rights and duties." Id.
148. Lorenz K6dderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons for its
Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 L. INJAPAN 105, 110 (1991) (detailing prevalence of
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Japanese ministries typically use oral guidance, rendering most
bureaucratic policy decisions non-reviewable because judicial in-
terpretation places administrative guidance outside the scope of
the doctrine of justiciability.'
ii. Standing to Challenge
Article 9151 of the ACLL limits standing to parties with a
legal interest in an administrative disposition.15 2 The ACLL re-
quires the plaintiff's injury to be a legal interest, whereas an in-
jury to a non-legal or factual interest will not suffice to give the
injured party standing to challenge an administrative act."' 3 Ju-
dicial interpretation of ACLL Article 9 concludes that standing is
not granted to individual interests except where an administra-
tive agency is specifically required by statute to protect those in-
dividual interests. 5 4 Courts in Japan hold, therefore, that where
an agency acts in the name of general public interest, individual
interests injured by the government act are only factual interests
and, thus, do not convey standing. 55
iii. Scope of Agency Discretion
If a party successfully establishes the existence of a justicia-
ble issue and the party has standing to litigate, they must then
oral guidance and difficulty of alleging infringement of rights); LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANCE, supra note 5, at 171 (discussing use of informal guidance and, where neces-
sary, bureaucratic pressure to reach consensus).
149. Michael K Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally En-
couraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 923, 953 (1984)
(describing voluntary nature of administrative guidance and disadvantages non-comply-
ing parties face).
150. Declining Industries Policy, supra note 135, at 430; K6dderitzsch, supra note 148,
at 110. The agency issues requests or suggestions, so that a recipient often has no
means to allege a violation. Id. "The institutional arrangements serve to make judicial
review of administrative action very difficult in Japan. Many agency operations are char-
acterized by a degree of informality so extensive that official administrative dispositions
often do not occur." Edelman, supra note 1, at 436.
151. ACLL art. 9, Law No. 139 of 1962 (Japan).
152. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 171-72; see Sakamoto v. Japan, 16
Minshu 57 (1962) (S. Ct.) (Japan) (holding that personal interests injured by govern-
ment action are not legal interests which convey standing to sue when government acts
in general public interest).
153. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 171-72
154. Id.
155. Id. at 172; see supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court decision denying standing to party with factual interest).
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convince the court of the illegality of the agency's actions.'56
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the act went beyond the
agency's scope of discretion.'5 7 While Japanese courts do not
hesitate to act decisively when the Government acts unjustly,158
courts are not very receptive to challenges of agency actions. 159
Rather, Japanese courts grant ministries very broad discretion
under the ministries' enabling statutes, making a successful chal-
lenge unlikely.160
B. What Is Administrative Guidance?
Administrative guidance, the process whereby bureaucratic
agencies request certain conduct and exert other forms of statu-
tory or non-statutory pressure to achieve compliance, is the pri-
mary method of enforcing regulations and implementing pol-
icy."' Japanese regulators issue warnings, requests, encourage-
156. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 173.
157. Id.
158. Declining Industries Policy, supra note 135, at 432. Blatant injustice is unlikely
in industrial policy matters. Id. Challenges would likely involve allegations that the
agency used improper procedure in making a decision or reached a decision inconsis-
tent with the relevant statute. Id. This is a simpler task if the statute is specific and
unambiguous. Id. Statutes are, however, rarely specific in economic areas. Id. Article
52 of the Foreign Exchange Control Law, for example, provides for the "healthy devel-
opment of the national economy." Gaikoku Kawase Qyobi Gaikokti Boeki Kanri Ho [Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law], Law No. 28 of 1949 (Japan) [hereinafter
FEFTCL].
159. Edelman, supra note 1, at 436. Institutional arrangements impeded judicial
review in Japan. Id. at 436. "Even after surmounting all the procedural hurdles, Japa-
nese courts are still not receptive to legal challenges to agency action." Id. at 436.
160. Id. at 438. Even though the formulation of industrial policy is inherently in-
formal, implementation often must use the implied threat of formal powers under stat-
utory provisions. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 173. Broadly worded provi-
sions make this task easier for the agencies. Id. at 170. In addition, businesses are
concerned about their ongoing relationship with the agency, so that any challenge of
an agency's authority will have negative repercussions in the future. Young, supra note
149, at 951-52 (analyzing absence of litigation against ministries' use of administrative
guidance because of long-term relationship between regulators and regulated parties).
161. MITSUO MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw 31-33 (1989) (discussing compulsory power of informal
requests and suggestions as administrative guidance and companies general deference
to guidance). While the Western emphasis is on the rule of law and the use of non
discretionary governmental controls, the "Japanese economic bureaucracy has long
found that its most effective powers are tailor-made, verbal, ad hoc agreements imple-
mented through 'administrative guidance.'" Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions
and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM 136, 159 (Frede-
ric C. Deyo ed., 1987) [hereinafter Political Institutions].
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ment, and suggestions, all of which fall under the general
heading of administrative guidance, to parties within a particular
ministry's jurisdiction.162 Administrative guidance is supported
by implied threats of action or inaction.1 63 The Japanese bu-
reaucracy relies heavily on administrative guidance, the effects of
which are felt throughout all aspects of business in Japan.'64
For parties that receive administrative guidance, the end re-
sult is typically compliance.1 65 Compliance is the norm even
where ministries lack explicit statutory authority to persuade par-
ties to comply with ministerial guidance.' 66 The flexibility or ex-
tra-legal nature of administrative guidance means that its exer-
cise is not always constrained by any legal limits. The lack of
162. MITI AND THEJAPANESE MIRACLE, supra note 50, at 265 (defining administra-
tive guidance).
163. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450. The agencies' threats often
involve matters unrelated to the subject of the guidance, but which fall under the juris-
diction of the particular ministry and effect the recipient of the guidance. Id.; see LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 171 (noting MITI's use of threats of collateral
future action against non-complying firms).
164. Paradox of Industrial Policy, supra note 31, at 111. Noting the reach of adminis-
trative guidance, Haley states:
What distinguishes Japan is the persuasive resort to informal enforcement in
contexts that seem to require formal regulation in other industrial states. In
Japan informal enforcement is not a process of governing, but has become the
process of governing. It is used to implement nearly all bureaucratic policy,
whether or not expressed in statute or regulation, at all levels of government
and all administrative offices. Japanese officials use informal enforcement to
implement policy in every conceivable situation from antitrust violations and
price controls to regulation of financial institutions and bowling alley business
hours to reduce juvenile crime.
Id.; see Mark A. Levin, Here's YourButter Knife, Happy Slashing, ASIAN WALL ST.J., Nov. 28,
1994, at 16 [hereinafter Happy Slashing] (describing effect of guidance on issues like
corporate hiring practice, size of text on business cards, and permissible office layout).
165. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450.
166. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANCE, supra note 5, at 176-84 (explaining MITI's use of
extra-legal guidance in 1965 Sumitomo Steel Incident, where MITI, lacking statutory
authority, forced overall decrease in steel production despite Sumitomo's initial re-
fusal). See MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 161, at 33 (discussing compliance
with guidance where ministry lacks legal authority to compel compliance). In.discuss-
ing the potential negative repercussions for parties that ignore guidance, the authors
point out that:
Despite its informality and a recent decline in its effectiveness, administrative
guidance is still a powerful governmental tool. Japanese businessmen gener-
ally feel that government directives must be respected, whether they are based
on legal authority or not. Business in Japan prefers to submit to government
direction and avoid confrontations, even if the government direction is wrong-
ful.
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clearly defined boundaries within which guidance operates,
therefore, results in an exercise of de facto rather than de jure
governmental power. 167
1. Categories of Guidance
Although agencies frequently use administrative gui-
dance,16 not all administrative guidance involves agencies seek-
ing conduct with which recipient parties disagree. 69 Agencies
often issue guidance that promotes or protects the recipient, or
helps mediate a dispute between parties desiring to avoid formal
adjudication. 70 Administrative guidance as a substitute for ac-
tual statutory authority is when guidance is most likely to evoke
negative reactions from the private sector.' 7' The various exam-
ples of guidance fall into one of three categories: (a) promo-
tional; 171 (b) adjudicatory; 17 and (c) regulatory. 1 74
a. Promotional Guidance
Government agencies in Japan provide advice, known as
promotional administrative guidance, to a company in order to
promote the company's interests. 75 The Japanese bureaucracy
uses promotional administrative guidance to offer assistance in a
167. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 69; see Edelman, supra note 1,
at 436 (discussing cases where ministry wants firm to take action that ministry has no
legal authority to compel, such as to reduce production).
168. Edelman, supra note 1, at 436-37; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8,
at 60. "[G]overnment agencies in Japan often choose not to use laws directly to accom-
plish their policy goals but to utilize the more informal process of persuasion when they
wish to control the conduct of private enterprises. This informal process of persuasion
is often called 'administrative guidance'." Id.
169. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 61-65 (describing positive uses
of administrative guidance to promote economic viability of firms and settle inter-firm
disputes).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 62-63; see supra note 166 (discussing regulatory guidance in context of
1965 Sumitomo Metals Incident where MITI informally enforced decrease in steel pro-
duction in order to stabilize domestic steel price).
172. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 61-62 (discussing agencies' use
of guidance to support business activities of private parties).
173. Id. at 63-64 (describing government role as mediator in disputes between two
private parties).
174. Id. at 62-63 (analyzing ministries' substitution of guidance for actual statutory
authority in controlling private party conduct).
175. Id. at 61. The ministry's policies generally reflect or support those of the
party that received the promotional guidance. Id.
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variety of sectors.1 76 Bureaucrats use promotional guidance,
sometimes in the form of financial assistance from government
financial institutions,1 77 to aid small enterprises in improving
production, research and development, and management.1 78 In
addition, ministries operate governmental agricultural research
facilities for the benefit of Japan's farmers. 79 The primary goal
of promotional administrative guidance, therefore, is to pro-
mote or protect the recipients of such advice.' 8 °
b. Adjudicatory Guidance
Government agencies sometimes use adjudicatory adminis-
trative guidance to help private parties resolve disputes among
themselves.' While formal legal disputes are left to the judicial
system, an agency's adjudicatory guidance allows parties to avoid
the public and adversarial aspects of court proceedings.18 2 A
prominent example of such guidance is MITI's mediation of
conflicts between large and small enterprises.1 83 Japanese Gov-
ernment agencies, as informal mediators, have succeeded in set-
tling many disputes, thus helping resolve issues and avoid judi-
cial proceedings." 4
c. Regulatory Guidance
Japanese bureaucrats use regulatory administrative gui-
dance as a non-statutory means of regulating private conduct.1
8 5
Regulatory guidance is used as a substitute for legal compul-
sion.86 The use of regulatory administrative guidance is particu-
176. Id.
177. Id. Examples include: the Medium and Small Enterprises Financial Bank,
the Commerce and Industries Central Finance Bank, and the People's Bank. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 63.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 62-63.
184. Id. at 64. "[T]he role of the government is that of an informal mediator,
advising and suggesting to the parties in the controversy ways of resolving a dispute.
This has proved to be effective and many disputes which the parties would never have
solved themselves have been resolved without utilizing court proceedings." Id.
185. Id. at 64-65.
186. Id. at 62-63. The focus of most writing on administrative guidance is on the
use of regulatory guidance where ministerial guidance substitutes for legal authority to
force recipients to comply. Id. By emphasizing the practice of putting all information
and requests in writing, issues addressed by the APL regarding fairness of procedure
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larly common in areas that involve non-domestic trade, like im-
port and export controls. 187 Even when there is no formal statu-
tory power to enforce a ministry's guidance, Japanese businesses
generally comply with regulatory administrative guidance. 188
Technically, there is no compulsory power to enforce the gui-
dance, but ministries use various means of persuasion to achieve
compliance.' 89 Regulatory guidance, therefore, is a powerful
tool used by government agencies.1 90
2. MITI and MOF: Powerhouses of Regulatory Informality
MITI and MOF are Japan's two most influential economic
ministries.19' Both ministries maintain highly educated and well-
trained staff,'92 and exert far-reaching authority over large por-
tions of the Japanese economy.' 93 Despite MITI and MOF'sju-
risdiction via broad statutory and non-statutory powers, there is
evidence that bureaucratic influence over the Japanese economy
is waning. 194
and transparency of administrative decision making processes constrain the use of arbi-
trary regulatory administrative guidance. APL arts. 5-37, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
187. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62.
188. Id. at 63. Government agencies have different types of persuasion techniques
available to insure compliance. Id. Combined with the realization that successful busi-
ness operations depend on close ties with the particular ministry, most businesses con-
cede to the ministry's wishes. Id.
189. Id. Ministries threaten to delay processing or to reject a party's application in
order to achieve compliance with its guidance. ENIGMA.OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note
6, at 450. The threatened application is often not directly related to the subject of the
ministry's guidance. Id.
190. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176-83 (reporting MITI's use of this
form of guidance to compel domestic steel industry to cut production and stabilize
domestic steel price).
191. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 13-18; SHINDO, supra note 1, at 90-91; see supra note 3
and accompanying text (discussing high degree of control over Japanese economy by
MITI and MOF).
192. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 51, at 112-15 (describing educational track for bu-
reaucratic elite); see supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing educational back-
ground for bureaucrats staffing government agencies).
193. See SHINDO, supra note 1, at 90-91 (describing degree of ministerial control in
Japanese economy)
194. See generally Roger Buckley, Signs of Decline and Fall for the Administrative State in
Japan, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 13, 1996, at 6 (discussing debate over break-up of
MOF); David E. Sanger, Mighty MITI Loses Its Grip, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1989, at 1 (detail-
ingJapanese companies' decreasing reliance on MITI for protection and promotion);
Tanya Clark, MITI's Dilemma: Reform or Be Reformed, ToKYo Bus. TODAY, June 1995, at 28
(arguing that MITI faces choice to stay same and wither under deregulation, or re-
engineer itself and help lead Japan);
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a. MITI
MITI was established in May 1949 to organize and support
the rebuilding of Japan's industrial base after the Second World
War. 195 MITI has since been a major factor in planning and im-
plementing national policies to expand Japanese trade and in-
dustry.19 6 Aided by close ties to the business world, MITI bureau-
crats are viewed as the primary architects of Japan's successful
post-war economic policy.197
MITI enforces over 130 statutes encompassing a wide range
of industrial sectors, including international trade, oil, and safety
standards.198 MITI's regulatory powers are, however, relatively
limited, forcing MITI to rely on administrative guidance. 199 Tra-
ditionally, MITI's administrative guidance, supported by licens-
ing authority under which MITI did not have to provide reasons
for granting or denying licenses, had a binding effect on compa-
nies likely to be affected by one or more of these 130 statutes.20 0
MITI has relied heavily on the use of extra-legal administrative
guidance where the ministry lacked explicit statutory author-
195. HuNTER, supra note 32, at 132.
196. Id. at 132-33.
197. Id. at 133.
198. Legal Framework of Trade, supra note 27, at 377.
199. Interview with Osamu Hirakawa, Attorney, Anderson Moi, in Tokyo, Japan
(July 1995) [hereinafter Hirakawa]; VOGEL, supra note 83, at 73. MITI does have some
statutory authority in certain areas. Id. MITI officials can: reserve licensing for firms
that adhere to standards set by MITI, control research funding, form cartels, subject to
Japan's Fair Trade Commission, and grant approval for licensing agreements between
Japanese and foreign companies. Id. MITI's successful control over the Japanese econ-
omy derives from the ministry's administrative guidance and voluntary cooperation
within industrial circles. Id.
200. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 68. Noting the effect of minis-
tries' wide-ranging authority on companies, the author argues that:
An enterprise with a wide range of operations (which is a feature of enter-
prises today) is likely to be affected by one or other of those powers possessed
by the agency which has the supervisory authority over its activities. The enter-
prise which has been made the subject of administrative guidance takes into
consideration possible consequences at present or in the future of ignoring
the administrative guidance and generally judges that to comply with the gui-
dance is a wise business policy.
Id.; see ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing compliance with
administrative guidance because of broad-based ministerial authority). Japanese minis-
tries leverage firms with threats of denying future applications or revoking current
licenses in cases where recipients hesitate to comply with guidance in other, unrelated
matters. Id.
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ity.2°1 MITI's influence over Japan's industrial sector from the
1950's through the 1970's allowed MITI to achieve compliance
through informal pressure. 20 2
Commentators argue that MITI has declined in power since
the height of its authority in the 1960's.203 Because MITI
reached its goal of helping Japanese industry grow from nascent
firms to globally competitive enterprises, MITI now has less lev--
erage over the companies that once sought MITI's assistance
and protection.2 0 4  Furthermore, Japan's manufacturing base
continues to shift overseas.20 5 Consequently, MITI's power in
201. Hirakawa, supra note 199; see LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176-88
(recounting MITI's extra-legal use of administrative guidance in 1960's to compel re-
duction in steel production to stabilize domestic steel price); see supra note 166 (discuss-.
ing steel production reduction incident).
202. Hirakawa, supra note 199. One commentator writes that MITI's guidance
during this period was like a parent company directing the actions of its subsidiary.
YosHIo SuzuKI, KISEIKANWA HA NAZE DEKINMA NO KA [WHY CAN'TJAPAN DEREGULATE] 36-
37 (1995) [hereinafter WHY CAN'T JAPAN DEREGULATE]. Since this period, MITI has
changed its focus and the guidance MITI now provides relates to deregulation. Id. at
37. This change resulted from criticism of the bureaucracy's excessive intervention in
the Japanese economy. Id. In fact, MITI has recently adopted an import-oriented ap-
proach, thus breaking from its past role as an export promoter and domestic market
protector. Id.
203. Hirakawa, supra note 199; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw, supra note 8, at 68;
see LAw AND SOCLAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176, 203 (noting that MITI's legal influ-
ence peaked in 1960's and has since declined); ChalmersJohnson, MITI, MPT, and the
Telecom Wars: How Japan Makes Policy for High Technology, in POLITICS AND PRODUCTrVTy:
How JAPAN's DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY WORS 177, 183 (Chalmers Johnson et al. eds.,
1989) [hereinafter Telecom Wars] (noting decline in MITI's jurisdiction since helping
Japanese firms attain global competitiveness).
204. Clark, supra note 194, at 28. MITI relies heavily on extra-legal administrative
guidance. Hirakawa, supra note 199. MITI's guidance is most effective when most of a,
particular industry agrees with the nature of the guidance. Id. MITI's ability to achieve
compliance is the weakest when an industry disagrees with the subject of the guidance.
Id.
205. Tatsuya Inoue, Trading Companies Open Investment Units in Asia, NIKKEI WKLY.,
Feb. 5, 1996, at 12 [hereinafter Trading Companies] (describing hollowing out as busi-
ness and industry shift overseas). In describing why Japan's major trading companies
are establishing investment affiliates and investment funds abroad, industry analysts
point to the "hollowing out, or move offshore, ofJapanese manufacturing." Id. Ana-
lysts concede that because the hollowing out of the manufacturing industry will lead to
a decrease in business in Japan, that trading companies are forced to seek more busi-
ness overseas. Id. Singapore has been a common destination for many trading compa-
nies, including Mitsubishi Corp. and Mitsui & Co. Id. Overseas output by Japanese
companies is on pace to surpass exports fromJapan in Fiscal Year 1995. Overseas Produc-
tion May Outpace Exports, NIKKEI WKLY., Apr. 1, 1996, at 3. The continuing shift to off-
shore production is attributed to the stronger yen. Id.
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implementing industrial policy has diminished." 6
b. MOF
MOF occupies a central position in the Japanese bureau-
cracy. 20 7 The primary sources of MOF's influence in the Japa-
nese economy are its control over budget, tax, and monetary
policy.2 18 MOF's enabling statute grants the ministry authority
to raise and spend public funds, as well as control over the bank-
ing, securities, and insurance industries. 2 9 Therefore, MOF has
jurisdiction over both the public and private financial sectors. l0
In governing the public sector, MOF annually determines all
government agencies' spending budgets,2 1 1 forcing all govern-
ment agencies to negotiate with MOF for their share of the na-
206. Hirakawa, supra note 199; Telecom Wars, supra note 203, at 183-84. Japan's big
businesses no longer need MITI's assistance to compete globally. Id. In addition,
.many industrialists seem to be continuing to shift their operations out of Japan."
Shijuro Ogata, On the Brink of Bigger Role: Japan's Economy May Have Peaked as It Becomes
More International, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at 14. "Government ministries used to be so
powerful and effective that many observers believed Japan would have no problem as
long as they remained in control. Those days are over, however. The bureaucracy has
long been paralysed by inter-ministerial rivalry and ties of patronage and obligation to
industrial interest groups." Id. See generally Madoka Takai, Vanishing Point Ahead: Indus-
try Begins to Disappear, ToKYo Bus. TODAY, Aug. 1995, at 8 (discussing rush of Japanese
industry overseas to avoid yen fluctuation); Norifumi Tsukada, Structural Change: As the
Yen Ratchets Higher, We're Running Out of Time, ToKYo Bus. TODAY, Aug. 1995, at 4 (con-
tending that Japan must deregulate and institute market-based regulatory scheme in
order to stem tide of companies leavingJapan for overseas locations).
207. KAZUO TATEWAKI, BANKING AND FINANCE IN JAPAN 175 (1991); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan,
30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 423 (1994); MOF Rules Japan's Public policy, U.S. Magazine Says,
Kyodo Newswire Service, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CURNWS
File [hereinafter MOF Rules Public Policy]; see Fingleton, supra note 3, at 72 (discussing
expanse of MOF's powers and control over public and private financial sectors). MOF
is at the apex of the Japanese administrative system. MOFRules Public Policy, supra. "In
regulating the financial system alone, it gathers under one roof powers that in the
United States are dispersed among the Federal Reserve, the Department of the Treas-
ury, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission." Fingleton, supra note 3, at 72.
208. Jin Nakamura, King of Ministries Under Fire, DAILY VOMIURI, Feb. 28, 1995, at 8
[hereinafter King of Ministries].
209. TATEWAm, supra note 207, at 175; Milhaupt, supra note 207, at 446.
210. TATEWAKI, supra note 207, at 175.
211. Shigeki Kakinuma & Hiroshi Fukunaga, Yes, We're Serious - BREAK UP the
Ministry of Finance, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Jan. 1995, at 9 [hereinafter Break Up MOE]. See,
e.g., Takao Toshikawa, Inside MOF: The Men from the Ministry, ToKYo Bus. TODAY, Jan.
1995, at 13 [hereinafter Inside MOE] (explaining that large part of MOF's authority
derives from its control over national budget).
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tional budget.2 12 With regard to the private financial sector,
MOF controls taxes and monetary policy for all financial institu-
tions operating in Japan. 2 13 MOF uses formal and informal gui-
dance to exert influence over financial institutions in order to
meet certain MOF goals. 14 Some of MOF's principal functions
include ensuring that financial companies follow legal require-
ments215 and regulating the flow of money from banks into the
private sector.21 6
MOF's guidance usually consists of a number of notifica-
tions or official letters issued to banks and financial institutions
under its jurisdiction.217 MOF informs banks of its policy direc-
tives and generally the private banks alter their behavior accord-
ingly.218 MOF's guidance affects rules of bank management,
bank accounting, credit ceilings, and branch establishment. 219
MOF has become more progressive since the late 1980's
when MOF officials realized they needed to alter the Japanese
212. ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 158-59; Karel van Wolferen, Ja-
pan's Non-Revolution, FOR. Arm., Sept. 1993, at 54 [hereinafter Japan's Non-Revolution].
213. King of Ministries, supra note 208, at 8; Brian W. Semkow, Japanese Banking
Law: Current Deregulation and Liberalization of Domestic and External Financial Transactions,
17 LAw & POL'v Iwr'L Bus. 81, 95 (1985) (citing MOF as key public authority empow-
ered with regulating "directly or indirectly the activities of all financial institutions in
Japan"); see Break Up MOF, supra note 211, at 6 (discussing MOF's domination of public
and private finance). "In its role as supreme regulator of all financial institutions, MOF
also dominates the private sector." Id.
214. Semkow, supra note 213, at 85. "Since there are neither legal checks to con-
strain the exercise of administrative guidance, nor formal legal remedies for its abuse,
MOF has a flexible instrument to influence financial institutions in light of rapidly
changing economic circumstances." Id. at 91. MOF's power goes beyond its statutory
authority. TATEWAm, supra note 207, at 175. "[E]xtensive private-level contact and con-
sultation with all participants in the industry" enhances MOF's influence. Id. Nothing
happens without explicit or implicit approval from MOF. Id.; Hirakawa, supra note 199;
Radin, supra note 90.
215. TATEWAKi, supra note 207, at 177.
216. ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 159. "Since the war Japanese
corporations have had little choice but to rely for capital on bank borrowings rather
than on equity raised in public markets." Id.
217. TATEWAKI, supra note 207, at 175.
218. Semkow, supra note 213, at 91; ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at
159. Japanese banking law assumes that banks will always follow MOF's interpretation
of the laws. Japan's Non-Revolution, supra note 212, at 58-59. Finance in Japan has
evolved into a system where finance firms seek prior approval from MOF for all busi-
ness decisions. Hirakawa, supra note 199. This includes instances where statutes are
silent on the issue of whether prior approval is necessary. Id. The general rule is that
an action not specifically provided for in the statute is prohibited. Id.; Radin, supra
note 90.
219. Semkow, supra note 213, at 91.
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financial system in order to allow Japanese firms to continue to
expand overseas.2  MOF's expedition of the approval process
for non-domestic borrowers seeking to utilize yen markets221 was
one example of this attitudinal shift.222 Since 1993, banks, insur-
ance companies, and securities companies can participate in one
another's markets. 22 3 This reform was designed to promote
competition and efficiency in Japan's financial markets. 224 De-
spite liberalization, MOF continued to regulate the flow of new
entrants into the Japanese financial sector and to require busi-
nesses to seek MOF's approval prior to issuing a new financial
instrument or service. 225
Bank-based financing has traditionally characterized the
Japanese financial system. 6 MOF's authority in this area has
diminished in recent years because the role of bank lending has
declined as major companies increasingly turned to capital mar-
kets for funding.227 MOF has traditionally maintained more con-
220. TATEWAKI, supra note 207, at 176.
221. Id. "The decision to speed up the approval process for foreign borrowers
wishing to tap yen-markets is tangible evidence of the change of attitude ... ." Id.
222. Id.
223. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 152. Legislative revision in 1992 granted com-
panies access to markets previously closed to the companies. Id.
224. Id.
225. TATEWAK, supra note 207, at 176. The approval process slows considerably
for innovative and unprecedented changes, because MOF officials scrutinize every
point prior to extending MOF's approval. Id. "When foreign banks were proposing to
introduce yen-yen swaps products, the MOF and the Bank of Japan held exhaustive
discussions to clarify exactly the full implications of the proposal before allowing these
deals to be marketed to domestic financial institutions in 1986." Id. MOF receives criti-
cism for its slow pace of deregulation. Id. MOF occasionally, however, acts quickly to
prevent potential problems from effecting Japanese financial markets. Id. The Minis-
try's actions during times of rapid action illustrate the flexibility built into MOF's infor-
mal system of regulation. Id.
226. Political Institutions, supra note 161, at 148, The primary source of funding for
Japanese companies between 1972-81 was banks. Id. Banks accounted for 75% of cor-
porate funds in 1972, compared to 19% from shares, and the figures for 1981 were 68%
from banks and 21% from shares. Id. "Indirect financing remains an intrinsic feature
... of mature developmental states such asJapan. Although such a system undoubtedly
restricts international capital flows, it remains in place because of the power, combined
with low political visibility, it gives to Ministry of Finance bureaucrats." Id. at 149.
227. Yumiko Suzuki, Companies Turn More to Capital Markets, NiKu.Ei WKLT., Feb. 5,
1996, at 12 [hereinafter Yumiko Suzuki]. The volume of bond issuances in 1995, while
still a fraction of total bank lending, increased 70% from the previous year. Id. The
increase is attributed to deregulation of requirements in bond issuance, and further
deregulation in 1996 will likely increase corporate reliance on capital markets. Id. Mit-
subishi Electric Corp., Japan's third largest electric-machinery maker, decreased its ra-
tio of loan debt to total debt to 30% from 60% at the end of 1989. Id. Analysts note
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trol over the banking industry than it has in the securities mar--
kets. 28 Analysts also note thatJapan's financial markets are hol-
lowing out as over-regulated, domestic financial markets provide
incentive for companies to raise capital in non-domestic mar-.
kets.22 9 Securities and banking scandals 30 have bolstered public
criticism of MOF and further weakened MOF's control over the
Japanese financial sector.231 Commentators call for major re-
that the "Japan Premium" in the Fall 1995 threatened the lending ability of Japanese
banks. Id. "In international lending, non-Japanese banks imposed a premium of up to
0.5% on lending rates to theirJapanese counterparts out of concerns thatJapan's trou..
bled financial system presented extra risks." Id. London branches of Japanese banks,
for example, had trouble borrowing. Id. Japanese trading houses noted that they have
been at an advantage with respect to banks since the early 1980's when companies be--
gan to reduce bank borrowings. Id.
228. Milhaupt, supra note 207, at 440.
229. Hollowing Out Japan's Financial Markets, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at 67. Fi-
nancial business is leavingJapan for Singapore, London, and Hong Kong. Id. Japan's
strict rules regarding listing on the Tokyo Exchange deter foreign and local investors.
Id. "Cash-hungry Chinese firms, for instance, are listing in Hong Kong and New York,
rather than in Tokyo." Id. Futures and options based on Japanese securities are in-
creasingly traded on the Singapore Exchange. Id. The number of foreign firms listed
on the Tokyo Exchange in 1994 dropped to 97 from 125 in 1993. Id.
230. See Milhaupt, supra note 207, at 423 (describing MOF's role in 1991 Securities
Compensation Scandal); Jathon Sapsford, Bank Regulators in Japan May End the Honor
System, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A21 [hereinafter Ending the Honor System] (discuss-
ing stock trading scandal in New York Office of Daiwa Bank which MOF's regulatory
style received criticism); Seiichiro Saito, Atarashii Nihon no Kinyu Shisutemu no Shozo [Por-
trait of a NewJapanese Financial System], EKONOMISUTO, Dec. 18, 1995, at 29-34 (discussing
role of MOF's inadequate regulatory controls in 1995 Daiwa Bank Incident, where New
York Daiwa Bank Office hid US$1.1 billion of trading losses from U.S. regulators);
Keikichi Honda, Jusen illustrate need for systemic reform, NiKKEi WKLY., Jan. 22, 1996, at 6
(noting decline of MOF's prestige because of role of jusen housing loan corporation
issue) "MOF partly exempted jusen from its administrative guidance in 1990 which
prohibited banks from increasing lending to property-related areas." Id. MOF's poli-
cies led to "wild property and stock-market speculation in the late 1980s and then it.
abruptly cut off the easy-money spigots in the early 1990s, causing land and stock prices
to slide." Jathon Sapsford, Japan Mulls Finance Ministry Breakup, ASIAN WALL ST. J.
Wv., Feb. 12, 1996, at 9 [hereinafter Finance Ministry Breakup]. MOF's image "has
been tarnished by its role in creating Japan's bad-loan crisis." Id. Reports note that
MOF plans to reform its rules regarding amakudari because of jusen issue. Fewer Ex-
Bureaucrats Take Private Posts, supra note 80, at 2. "Amakudari... has been under fire
because of possible links to the finance industry's bad-loan crisis ... ." Id.
231. Michael Hirsh,Japan: The Waning of the MOF, INST. INVESTOR, Dec. 30, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File (reporting decline of MOF's influ-
ence because of confluence of scandals and poor financial conditions in Japan);
Michael Williams, Wiping theEgg Off the Ministry's Face, WALL ST.J., Oct. 27, 1995, atA0
(discussing negative effect on MOF's authority and prestige because of Daiwa Bank's
New York Branch scandal and trading losses cover-up and jusen housing loan scandal).
MOF has "suffered a slew of recent embarrassments, ranging from its clumsy handling
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form of MOF's scope of authority, with some even calling for the
total abolition of MOF.232
3. Administrative Guidance in Practice
MITI and MOF regulate companies within their jurisdiction
using administrative guidance and licensing authority.23 3  In
practical terms, MITI and MOF's wide-ranging powers and per-
vasive informal ties to businesses provides leverage against com-
panies and aids the ministries in regulatory governance.234 Sev-
eral examples of administrative guidance illustrate the respective
powers of both MITI and MOF and their informal methods of
pressuring firms to comply with administrative guidance.235
a. The Sumitomo Metals Incident
MITI's authority was at its peak in the 1950's and 1960's.216
Control over imports via the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law2"7 ("FEFTCL") combined with its authority
to grant or deny permits to do business under statutes like the
Petroleum Industry Law23 8 ("PIL") to permit MITI to exercise
absolute control over its jurisdiction. 239 Not surprisingly, chal-
lenges to MITI's authority were rare during this period.24 ° One
notable exception, involving the Sumitomo Metals Corporation,
underscores MITI's influence through its use of administrative
of Daiwa Bank Ltd.'s $1.1 billion loss, to shocking cases of influence-peddling by two
top ministry officials." Williams, supra, at A10.
232. Break Up MOF, supra note 211, at 6 (advocating dissolution of MOF); Finance
Ministry Breakup, supra note 230, at 9 (discussing growing criticism of MOF and public
and political pressure to break MOF into several smaller bodies).
233. OMrYA, supra note 122, at 113-18 (discussing regulatory authority of MITI and
MOF consisting of combination of administrative guidance and authority to grant or
deny licenses, applications, permits, and approvals).
234. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450-51 (discussing effectiveness
of ministries using guidance to leverage firms to comply with industrial policy).
235. See LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176-84 (discussing use of gui-
dance to force reduction in steel production); KANEKO, supra note 1, at 15-18 (describ-
ing MOF's role in 1991 securities scandal where securities firms compensated clients for
stock losses after MOF requested closure of certain accounts).
236. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176.
237. FEFTCL, Law No. 28 of 1949 (Japan).
238. Sekiugyo Ho [Petroleum Industry Law], Law No. 128 of 1962 (Japan).
239. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW,
supra note 8, at 66.
240. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 176.
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guidance.241
The price of steel in Japan in the mid-1960's was dropping
rapidly because a general recession resulted in an excess supply
of steel and threatened to bankrupt several of Japan's largest
producers.242 MITI, in response to this decline in demand and
pursuant to the PIL, sought to stabilize the domestic price of
steel.243 MITI determined that all domestic steel companies in
Japan's steel production cartel, which MITI helped coordinate,
should decrease production by ten percent.2 "4
Sumitomo Metals was the only firm in the cartel that re-
fused to adhere to MITI's guidance.245 The other leading firms
decided to maintain the cartel and pressured MITI to force
Sumitomo to comply. 21 MITI sought Sumitomo's compliance,
but the company refused to yield. 47 MITI responded that it
would use its legal authority under the FEFTCL248 to limit
Sumitomo's importation of necessary raw materials to the
amount needed to meet the company's allotment as a cartel
member.2
49
241. Id. at 176-84 (analyzing 1965 Sumitomo Metals Incident where MITI com-
pelled decrease in steel production via informal means); see ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER,
supra note 6, at 451 (discussing effective use of MITI's guidance in Sumitomo Metals
Incident combined with ostracism from community of competitors to force recalcitrant
firm to comply with production decrease).
242. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 177; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW,
supra note 8, at 62.
243. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 177.
244. Id. at 178; see TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62 (discussing
MITI's efforts to reduce steel production).
245. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62; LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE,
supra note 5, at 177. Among the top six steel producers in Japan, Osaka-based
Sumitomo Metals was the only firm that outright refused MITI's requests to hire former
MITI bureaucrats through the amakudari system. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note
5, at 177. See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text (discussing effect of amakudari
system on business-government relations). Adding to the closeness of business-govern-
ment ties in this incident was the close cooperation that characterized MITI's relation-
ship with the steel industry in the Post-WWII period. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra
note 5, at 177. The importance of the steel industry and the relative volatility of the
world steel market led corporate managers and MITI bureaucrats to coordinate the rate
of expansion or rate of.production. Id.
246. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 179.
247. Id. at 178; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62.
248. FEFTCL, Law No. 228 of 1949 (Japan).
249. TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62. "MITI had the power to
allocate foreign currency to importers and, without such allocation it was impossible for
the company to import the necessary coal and iron ore for production." Id.; LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 179. This was the first time MITI publicly threatened
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In the aftermath of this clash, Sumitomo and MITI tried to
gather support for their respective positions within the eco-
nomic community at large.25 ° MITI and the remaining cartel
members ultimately prevailed because of their entrenched influ-
ence in Tokyo, the national capital, as compared to Sumitomo's
localized influence among other business leaders in Osaka
City.251 Pressure on Sumitomo to comply continued to grow as
the steel market weakened and financial circles began to lose
confidence in the economy.252 Sumitomo's representatives
eventually met with MITI officials and reached a compromise
where Sumitomo agreed to produce at the rates stipulated in
MITI's directive.255
b. The Lions Oil Incident
In December 1984, the Petroleum Council, 2 4 an advisory
body to the Minister of MITI, urged MITI to prevent Japanese
gas stations from importing less expensive, non-domestic gaso-
line.255 Lions Oil filed an application to import 3000 kiloliters of
gasoline from Singapore on December 3, 1984.56 MITI later
sent Lions Oil instructions calling for the company to stop its
planned imports.257 Lions Oil publicly stated that it would file
the exercise of formal statutory power against a firm that refused to comply with its
informal administrative guidance. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 179.
Sumitomo responded that MITI's actions violated it's rights as a company to make its
own business decisions and manage its own affairs. Id.
250. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANCE, supra note 5, at 179. The goal was to isolate
Sumitomo and force the firm back into line by building an overwhelming consensus
within Japan's financial and economic elites to maintain the production cartel and de-
crease production of steel. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 181; TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 8, at 62.
254. MITI Urged to Halt Gasoline Imports, Jiji Press Ticker Serv., Dec. 24, 1984, avail-
able in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File. The Petroleum Council is an advisory
body to the Minister of MITI. Id.
255. Id. (notingJapan's practice of importing crude oil for domestic refining and
controlling supply to reflect demand). The Council maintained that imports of foreign
gasoline supply would upset the stable supply of petroleum products. Id.
256. Id.; Susan Chira, Japan's Oil Import Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1985, at D 10.
257. Gasolinimporter to Prepare Lawsuit Against M/TIJiji Press Ticker Serv., Dec. 27,
1984, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File. MITI had no legal authority
to compel what they were requesting of Lions Oil, but all importers must report import
plans to MITI, which then issues administrative guidance. Chira, supra note 256, at
D10.
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suit against MITI if the ministry tried to prevent the imports.258
Lions Oil brought one shipment of gasoline into Japan de-
spite MITI's instructions .259 After ordering the first import ship-
ment from Singapore, however, Lions Oil reported that it was
having trouble obtaining letters of credit from banks that were
reluctant to extend credit to Lions Oil because of MITI's recom-
mendation. 60 An inability to arrange financing, thus, made it
impossible for Lions Oil to continue importing gasoline.26' In
January 1985, Lions Oil announced that it had given up efforts
to import gasoline because of MITI's administrative guidance
banning the imports.262 During the period when Lions Oil im-
ported the first shipment, the company owed a large sum in
taxes and could not, therefore, financially afford to prolong re-
sisting MITI's guidance. 263 Lions Oil sought a loan from its pri-
mary bank, which refused the loan because it felt the imports
conflicted with national policy.2 6
4
The Lions Oil Incident drew foreign criticism that Japan's
petroleum market was a closed market.265 Keidanren266 led do-
258. Chira, supra note 256, at D10. Lions Oil President, Taiji Sato, said that MITI
and the petroleum industry were "conspiring to hamper the import of lower-priced
gasoline" even though imports of petroleum products were legal if the authorities were
informed beforehand. Id. Lions Oil sought to have MITI issue an official report show-
ing the ministry's authority to instruct Lions Oil not to import the gasoline. Id.
259. Lions Oil Pressured Into Giving Up Gasoline Import, Jii Press Ticker Serv., Jan. 1,
1985, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File.
260. Id.; Chira, supra note 256, at D10. According to Lions Oil President, Sato, the
bank lending the money to buy the gasoline withdrew its funding, thereby forcing the
company to give up the project. Id.
261. Lions Oil Pressured Into Giving Up Gasoline Import, supra note 259. The com-
pany revealed that its financial standing prevented it from waging a long-term challenge
to MITI's instructions. Id.
262. Lions Oil Gives Up Gasoline Import, Jji Press Ticker Serv.,Jan. 8, 1985, available
in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File. Lions Oil's President Sato cited the primary
reason for giving up as the banks' refusal to finance the imports because of MITI's
recommendation. Id. Sato criticized MITI's policy as contrary to liberalized trade. Id.
MITI threatened to use its statutory powers under an import trade control ordinance to
block the gasoline imports. Gasoline Import Allegedly Suspended Under M1TI's Pressure, Ja-
pan Econ. Newswire, Jan. 9, 1985, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File.
263. Out-roared by MITI, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1985, at 66.
264. Id. President Sato said MITI pressured the bank to deny the loan, after fail-
ing to talk Sato out of importing the foreign gasoline. Id.
265. Japan Facing Pressure to Liberalize Petroleum Product Imports, Jiji Press Ticker
Serv.,Jan. 23, 1985, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File. A group of U.S.
Senators and Congressmen visitingJapan criticized the existence of a de facto ban on
petroleum imports. Id. The Singapore media publicly supported Lions Oil's efforts
and criticized MITI's policy as protectionist. Id.
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mestic criticism of MITI's control over Japan's petroleum mar-
ket.26 7 A ranking official in the trade organization criticized
MITI for not allowing gasoline imports into Japan..68
c. The Securities Compensation Scandal
The Securities Compensation Scandal illustrates MOF's in-
formal regulatory style. 269 This incident highlights problems in
MOF's regulatory enforcement, in particular, widespread
amakudari and the use of administrative guidance. 27° The scan-
dal focused on illegal compensation of clients by Japan's four
largest ("Big Four") securities houses.271
MOF issued a policy directive in December 1989 ordering
brokerages to close out discretionary investment accounts man-
aged by securities houses on behalf of their corporate clients. 272
Clients demanded compensation for contracts that were broken
when brokerages closed the accounts in the midst of poor mar-
ket conditions in early 1990.27" The Big Four securities houses
were later fined and had their services temporarily suspended
because they disregarded MOF's directive forbidding compensa-
tion of clients for investment losses.2 7 4 MOF's administrative gui-
dance in 1989 emphasized, however, the need for speedy closure
of the accounts. 2 75 Commentators, therefore, view MOF's gui-
dance as tacitly authorizing the illegal client compensation as a
266. Keidanren Official Raps MITI's Pressure on Gasoline Imports, Jiji Press Ticker
Serv., Jan. 28, 1985, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File [hereinafter
Keidanren Official]. Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organizations, is a major
pro-business lobby in Japan. Id.; OMIVA, supra note 122, at 193-95.
267. Keidanren Official, supra note 266.
268. Id.
269. SHI-NDO, supra note 1, at 7; KANEKO, supra note 1, at 15; Milhaupt, supra note
207, at 423.
270. Milhaupt, supra note 207, at 424.
271. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 15-16. The Big Four securities houses include:
Nomura Securities, Daiwa Securities Co., Yamaichi Securities Co., and Nikko Securities.
Id.; The Securities Scandal, REP. FROM JAPAN, June 25, 1991. available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, ARCNWS File [hereinafter Securities Scandal].
272. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 7; Securities Scandal, supra note 271.
273. SHI-NDo, supra note 1, at 7-8. The clients sought to recover losses that resulted
from a sharp drop in value of the stocks where the securities houses had invested
money. Id.
274. MOF Penalizes 'Big Four' Brokerages Over Scandal, Japan Econ. Newswire, Oct. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File.
275. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 7.
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necessary evil in order to quickly close the specified accounts. 276
The ambiguity of later statements from MOF's Securities Bureau
indicated that MOF tolerated the illegal practice of compensat-
ing clients for losses sustained on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.277
The Big Four securities firms later revealed that MOF had
occasionally pressured securities houses to compensate major cli-
ents for trading losses.278 The scandal resulted in the resigna-
tion of senior securities firms' executives, 79 caused decreased
confidence in the Tokyo Stock Market, 2 0 and implicated unethi-
cal conduct by MOF officials. 281 The Minister of Finance later
resigned, admitting MOF's role in the scandal via the use of ad-
ministrative guidance. 282 The scandal led to criticism of MOF's
loose style of governance and use of administrative guidance in
276. Steve Burrell, Japan: Ministy of Finance 'Turned Blind Eye' in Share Scandal,
AuSTL. FIN. REv.,June 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File. "At
best, the exposure of the compensation deals -which breach ministry guidelines issued
in 1989 - suggest that the ministry failed badly in its supervision of the market ... But
admissions that the schemes went ahead with the knowledge and tacit approval of the
ministry will badly damage its standing." Id. The compensation involved brokers buy-
ing back shares at artificially high prices from investment trusts they managed for their
corporate clients. Id.
277. Securities Scandal, supra note 271. MOF officials admitted that a December
1989 pronouncement regarding the closure of the discretionary accounts was too vague
because it did not specifically prohibit client compensation. Id. Later reports quoted
senior MOF officials, confirming that the ministry had looked the other way as securi-
ties houses compensated clients for millions of dollars of trading losses. Burrell, supra
note 276.
278. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 8; Securities Scandal, supra note 271. Daiwa claimed to
have spent US$90 million to compensate 20 corporate clients. Securities Scandal, supra
note 271. Yamaichi Securities paid US$5.4 million to four clients. Id. Nomura Securi-
ties paid US$117.9 million and Nikko Securities paid US$121.43 million. Id. Some
claim that the MOF securities bureau knew of the payments since as early as 1990, yet
MOF gave unofficial approval for brokers to shield major clients from major trading
losses. Burrell, supra note 276.
279. Burrell, supra note 276. "The growing scandal led to the resignations ... of
the presidents of Nomura Securities, the world's largest securities house, and Nikko
Securities, Japan's third-largest.. .. " Id.
280. Id. (discussing decrease in market confidence because of revelation concern-
ing illegal stock losses compensation by Big Four securities firms).
281. Id. Much of the trouble resulted from the incompatible roles played by MOF.
Bureaucratic 'Guidance' is Unwanted, Unwarranted, NiKKEi WKLY., Aug. 24, 1991, at 6 [here-
inafter Guidance is Unwanted]. MOF seeks to protect and promote finance firms, super-
vise these firms, and keep the markets in good shape. Id. Editorials blame the scandal
on these incompatible roles, and advocate the assignment of these roles to separate
agencies. Id.
282. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 16; Clay Chandler & Masayoshi Kanabayashi, Japan's
Securities Flap Causes Tension Between Big Brokers and Finance Ministiy, WALL ST. J., July 1,
1991. at A10.
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regulating financial markets. 283
In the wake of the scandal, MOF clarified and reduced the
number of rules governing Japan's securities markets.284 MOF
hoped to improve the fairness and transparency of regulations in
the securities industry by deregulating and formalizing the finan-
cial sector.285 While noting that codification and simplification
of procedures are generally beneficial, MOF officials warned
that formal rules allowed less leeway for firms that violate the
rules.286
C. Factors Contributing to Enactment of New APL and Legislative
Histoy
Efforts to enact a comprehensive APL in Japan began nearly
forty years prior to the APL's enactment. 287 Given the level of
bureaucratic resistance, passage of the APL in 1993 attracted
much attention. 88 Corruption scandals in the financial sec-
tor,28 9 largely blamed on informal regulatory methods, bolstered
by increased foreign and domestic criticism, added to the pres-
283. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 17; Guidance is Unwanted, supra note 281, at 6. Ad-
ministrative guidance helped Japan during the rapid growth period after WWII. Id.
Use of guidance in contemporary Japan, however, hinders and harms the Japanese
economy "by widening the gap between the development of the national economy and
individual citizens' affluence." Id.
284. Ministry of Finance Clarifies, Reduces Securities Market 'Administrative Guidances,'
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Aug. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ARCNWS File.
MOF revealed that the number of relevant regulations dropped from about 500 to 35.
Id. MOF codified some of the guidelines, placed others under the responsibility of the
Japan Securities Dealers Association ("JSDA"), and simply eliminated others. Id. Trans-
ferring authority to theJSDA transformed theJSDA from a "friendship association" into
a self-regulating body. Id.
285. Id. MOF's actions were attributed to the desire for MOF to place a buffer
between the securities industry and the ministry following the Securities Compensation
Scandal. Id. MOF was accused of operating in a collusive manner and of lax enforce-
ment of securities rules. Id.
286. Id.
287. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16.
288. Id. (noting importance of APL enactment in light of bureaucratic resistance);
K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 135.
289. See Honda, supra note 230, at 6 (discussing jusen problem and role of MOF's
regulatory methods); Milhaupt, supra note 207, at 423 (describing MOF's role in 1991
Securities Compensation Scandal); Ending the Honor System, supra note 230, at A21 (dis-
cussing stock trading scandal in New York Office of Daiwa Bank which MOF's regula-
tory style received criticism); See supra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing
MOF's role in series of financial scandals in 1990's).
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sure on Japan to reform its regulatory system.29 °
1. Economic Situation
Businesses operating in Japan must comply with numerous
regulations. 291 Non-domestic firms cite the regulatory system
and administrative guidance for difficulties encountered in daily
business operations.2 92 Public opinion polls report that many
Japanese share this sentiment, blaming economic ministries and
too many regulations for the high cost of living in Japan.293
Over-regulation is blamed for Japan's inability to recover
from recent years of economic recession, which bolstered calls
for deregulation.29 4 Moreover, Japan's manufacturing and fi-
nancial bases are shifting to other Asian countries, including Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong.2 95 Companies and potential investors
seek markets with fewer regulations and markets where the regu-
latory system employs predictable market regulations. 96
Corruption scandals increased calls to reform Japan's ad-
ministrative machinery.2 97 Reports of collusive relations between
290. SHINDO, supra note 1, at 15 (noting increased pressure to reform Japan's non-
transparent regulatory system after SII Talks).
291. Bob Davis et al., Red-Tape Traumas: To All U.S. Managers Upset by Regulations:
Try Germany or Japan, WALL ST.J., Dec. 14, 1995, at 1 (showing that firms operating in
Japan face multiplicity of regulations in all facets of their business operations). Reports
show that by fiscal year 1993, MITI led the field, with 1769 regulations, a drop of over
210 from Fiscal Year 1992, and MOF governed 1391 regulations, a rise of four from
Fiscal Year 1992. Hiroshi Nakame, Numbers Show Deregulation, Management Agency Says,
NIKaEI WKLv., Dec. 19, 1994, at 3.
292. Doing Business in Japan, supra note 4, at 6.
293. Bureaucratic Regulations Blamed For Japan's High Cost of Living, NIKKEI WKLv.,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 2. See Structural Problems Hinder Rapid Recovery, NIKEI WKLY., Dec. 12,
1994, at 6 [hereinafter Structural Problems] (citing pro-reform MITI bureaucrat conced-
ing that Japan must deregulate to be competitive internationally); David P. Hamilton
et. al., A Revival ofJapan's Economy Is Said to Depend On Tokyo's Willingness to Cut Regulatory
Noose, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLv., May 1, 1995, at 16.
294. See Hamilton, supra note 293, at 16 (discussing negative effect of over-regula-
tion on Japanese economy and resulting drive to deregulate). Deregulating markets
increases investor flexibility, improves efficiency, shrinks transaction costs, creates a
fairer market, and attracts capital investment. SARmusJ. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF
THE WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 54 (1990); see Taichi Sakaiya, Deregulation Would Spur
Industry, Enhance Life, NIKKEI WKLY., July 11, 1994, at 7 (arguing that new growth and
preventing hollowing out of industries are only achievable through deregulation).
295. Ogata, supra note 206, at 14; Structural Problems, supra note 293, at 6.
296. See KHOURY, supra note 294, at 54 (discussing positive effects of deregulation
on financial activities).
297. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 18-20; Mari Koseki, Trade Pacts Throw Spotlight on
Administrative Guidance, JAPAN TIMES WKLY. INT'L EDITION, Aug. 2-8, 1993, at 14; see supra
1725
1726 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1686
bureaucrats, politicians, and businesses drew criticism of bureau-
cratic governance in Japan.298 Criticism focused on the use of
informal regulatory methods and the abuse of the system caused
by businesses or politicians seeking to influence bureaucratic be-
havior.299
2. Foreign and Domestic Criticism of Informal Guidance as
Barrier to Market Access
Pressure from foreign countries, criticizing informality in
administrative process, contributed to the drive that ultimately
led to the APL.3 00 Foreign firms operating in Japan and domes-
tic Japanese firms cite administrative guidance and the lack of
transparency in regulatory process for the loss of business confi-
dence in Japan.3 0 Domestic and overseas pressure was essential
to the push for deregulation and administrative reform. 0 2
notes 269-86 and accompanying text (analyzing Securities Compensation Scandal and
effect of MOF administrative guidance).
298. Finance Ministiy issues plan to improve bank regulation, Nigual WKLY., Nov. 13,
1995, at 3 [hereinafter Plan to Improve Bank Regulation]. The Daiwa Bank incident is a
recent example of the abuse inherent in Japan's informal regulatory style. Id. Occur-
ring late last year, this incident involved Daiwa's New York trading office, with MOF's
knowledge, concealing from American regulators US$1.1 billion worth of stock losses
incurred on the New York Stock Exchange. Sandra Sugawara, Japan Plans Major Over-
haul of Banking Inspections, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 1995, at BI. This incident illustrates
Japan's informal regulatory style, which necessitates close ties between businesses and
the government. Id. News sources reveal that Daiwa informed MOF of the problem at
least six weeks before U.S. regulators found out about the cover-up. Finance Ministry
Must Share Blame for Daiwa Bank Scandal, NiluEi WKLY., Nov. 13, 1995, at 6 [MOF Must
Share Blame]. Editorials in the Japanese press cite Daiwa and MOF as both partly re-
sponsible for the cover-up. Id. The Japanese press views MOF as responsible for creat-
ing the atmosphere in which the Daiwa Bank Scandal developed. Id. In the wake of the
scandal, MOF unveiled a plan to change to a regulatory system based on clearly defined
rules and more dependent on outside inspections. Plan to Improve Bank Regulation,
supra, at 3.
299. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 5 (discussing Iron Triangle and efforts to influ-
ence bureaucratic decision making).
300. Yasushi Nakayama, Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho no Gaiyo [An Outline of the Administrative
Procedures Law], 537 NBL [NEw BusIN~ss LAw] 6 (1994) (recounting increasing foreign
and domestic pressure to enact APL).
301. Doing Business in Japan, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing foreign firms' com-
plaints regarding doing business in Japan); Shibaita & Fukuei, supra note 14, at 4.
302. Interview with Christopher Wells, Attorney, White & Case, Tokyo, Japan
(june, 1995) [hereinafter Wells]; Interview with Matthew Goodman, U.S. Dept. of
Treasury, Financial Attache, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan (July, 1995) [hereinafter
Goodman] (noting that Japanese Government sought United States' input regarding
contents of new APL prior to final drafting).
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3. Legislative History
The Japanese Diet enacted the APL on November 12,
1993,"0' to officially take effect on October 1, 1994.04 Despite
decades of bureaucratic resistance and political infighting,3 5 af.
ter three administrative reform councils 0 6 and years of foreign
pressure, 0 7 Japan passed its first comprehensive law designed to
formalize administrative procedures. 3 " Debate over the need
for an APL in Japan began in the late 1920's, inspired by reports
of Germany and France experimentation with laws concerning
procedural and substantive fairness. 30 9 The drive for an APL
continued in the Post-World War II period, influenced by the
occupation of the United States and the passage of a U.S. admin-
istrative procedure law.3 10 From 1948 through the early 1960's,
the Japanese Government always had one or more shingikai3t '
debating bureaucratic reform and the need for an APL. 1
Although administrative procedures were simplified during this
period, administrative reform shingikai failed to lead to the en-
303. Kosei de tomeina gyosei tetsuzuki ho no kakurtitsu [The Establishment of a Fair, Trans-
parent Administrative Procedures Law], ToKI NO HoREi, Nov. 15, 1994, at 7 [hereinafter
Fair, Transparent APL] (listing chronology of major events during thirty-year period
before enactment of APL).
304. Boling, supra note 7, at 7.
305. Nobumichi Izumi, Bureaucrats, 'Tribal'Politicos Threatened by Procedures Bill; Ad-
ministrative Guidance'is Technically Over, NIKKCEI WxLY., June 21, 1993, at 7. "Ministries,
faced with the possibility that their considerable influence might be diminished, have
put up stiff opposition." Id.; see MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 194
(1964) (describing bureaucratic infighting caused by attempts to preserve and enlarge
upon areas over which bureaucrats have discretion as common trait to all bureaucra-
cies).
306. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16. The Government set up these councils
at various points in time to investigate administrative processes and make recommenda-
tions for ways to improve the regulatory system. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 55-57.
307. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16; see Nakayama, supra note 300, at 6
(describing increased pressure from United States and Europe for Japan to address
transparency problems in regulatory processes).
308. APL art 1(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The APL "seeks to advance a
guarantee of fairness and progress towards transparency ... in administrative process
..... nId.
309. Boling, supra note 7, at 12.
310. Id.; KANEKO, supra note 1, at 36 (discussing effect of U.S. Occupation ofJapan
after WWII on development of Japanese administrative law).
311. See LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 5, at 199 (discussing composition and
role of government deliberation councils in policy making); see supra notes 96-104 and
accompanying text (discussing shingikai deliberation councils).
312. JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 74, at 118-19; Boling, supra note 7, at 12-13.
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actment of the APL.313
The first shingikai report of the First Provisional Commis-
sion to Investigate Administration,314 published in 1964, failed to
result in legislation of an administrative procedures bill.315 The
Second Provisional Commission 3 16 issued a report in 1983 out-
lining substantive areas to be included in an APL.3 17 Several
years later, in 1990, the Second Gyokakushin,318 or Reform Coun-
cil, released its report.319 Later in 1990, the Government set up
a third reform council, charged by then-Prime Minister Toshiki
Kaifu's administration with the goal of improving the trans-
parency and fairness of Japan's administrative processes.3 2' The
Third Reform Council's report,3 21 submitted to the Management
and Coordination Agency3 22 ("MCA") in 1991, included draft
legislation.32 3 The APL enacted in 1993 resembled, in large
313. JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 74, at 119. "[Tlhe government readjusted
and consolidated some 1,641 permissions, approvals, licenses, and so forth (ky-
oninkaken) that the public previously had to obtain from bureaucratic offices.., and
did the same for some 1,636 reports that citizens had to make to ministries and agen-
cies (about 22 percent of the total of 7,449 such reports)." Id. at 119-20.
314. See Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 7 (listing chronology of meetings
and reports that predated APL's enactment). The name of the shingikai was the
Daiichiji rinji gyosei chosakai [The First Provisional Commission to Investigate Administration].
Id.
315. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 7; Boling, supra note 7, at 13; Izumi,
supra note 305, at 7.
316. Dainiji rinji gyosei chosakai no 'Gyosei kaikaku ni kan suru daigoji toshin' [Second
Provisional Commission to Study Administration's Fifth and Final Report on Administrative Re-
form'], reprinted in DEETABUKKU GYoSEI TETSUZUKi Ho [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW
DATABOOK] 346 (1995) [hereinafter APL DATABOOK].
317. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 7; Boling, supra note 7, at 13.
318. Dainiji rinji gyosei kaikaku suishin shingikai no 'Saishu toshin' [Second Provisional
Administration Reform Deliberation Council's 'Final Report'], reprinted in APL DATABOOK,
supra note 316, at 350.
319. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 6; Boling, supra note 7, at 13.
320. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 6.
321. Daisanji rinji gyosei kaikaku suishin shingikai no 'Kosei tomeina gyosei tetsuzuki hosei
no seibi ni kan suru toshin' [Third Provisional Administrative Reform Council Report], reprinted
in APL DATABOOK, supra note 316, at 350 [hereinafter Third Reform Council Report].
322. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 6. The Management and Coordina-
tion Agency ("MCA") is an administrative office established within the executive branch
Office of the Prime Minister. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 23. The office plays a key
role in the campaign to achieve administrative reform in Japan. Interview with Katsuya
Uga, Professor of Law, Tokyo University, Tokyo, Japan (June 1995) [hereinafter Uga
Interview]. The MCA controls administrative counseling to ensure proper handling of
the public's complaints and requests concerning government work. IPMS GROUP, supra
note 56, at 92.
323. IPMS GROUP, supra note 56, at 84.
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part, the draft law submitted with the Third Reform Council Re-
port entitled the "Report on Introducing Unified Legal Systems
for Fair and Transparent Administrative Procedures."
3 24
Former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, who entered
office shortly after publication of the Third Reform Council Re-
port, championed the cause of administrative reform during his
administration from 1993 to 1994.325 In his first major policy
speech, Prime Minister Hosokawa pledged an intention to push
for enactment of an administrative procedures bill to improve
transparency and fairness in administrative processes.3 26 The
Hosokawa Administration succeeded in its pledge when the Gov-
ernment enacted the APL3 27 based on the draft law submitted to
the administration in the Third Reform Council Report.
328
II. WHAT DOES THE APL DO?
The APL is designed to increase the level of transparency in
administrative process.3 2 9 Divided into four main sections, the
APL is designed to improve clarity and transparency of adminis-
trative guidance,3 3 0 secure speedy and transparent processing of
applications, 33 1 establish guidelines for acceptance of notifica-
tions,33 2 and provide just and fair procedure regarding adminis-
324. Fair, Transparent APL, supra note 303, at 8; Boling, supra note 7, at 13. Com-
pare APL, Law No. 88 of 1993 with Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho Yokoan [Administrative Procedure
Law Draft Outline], reprinted in APL DATABOOK, supra note 316, at 354-79.
325. Boling, supra note 7, at 7.
326. Id.
327. APL, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
328. Id.; K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 105.
329. APL art. 1(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Article 1(1) defines the APL's
purpose as seeking to "advance a guarantee of fairness and progress towards trans-
parency (here meaning, that there be clarity in the public understanding of the con-
tents and processes of administrative determinations .... ) in administrative process."
Id. Article 1(2) states, however, that where other statutes have special provisions that
already provide for transparency with respect to dispositions, notifications, and adminis..
trative guidance, the other statutes will govern. Id. art. 1(2). One commentator noted
thatJapan has 1600 laws, but only one (the APL) that mentions transparency. Gyosei
Tetsuzuki Ho ni Tamashi Ireyou [Let's Keep with the Spirit of the Administrative Procedures
Law], NIHON KF.izAi SHIMBUN, Oct. 1, 1994, at 2; see Yagi, supra note 18, at 2-3 (describ-
ing APL's purpose as improving fairness and transparency of administrative manage-.
ment); Making Government More Transparent, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that goal of APL
is to make administrative processes of government agencies more transparent).
330. APL arts. 32-36, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
331. Id. arts. 5-11.
332. Id. art. 37.
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trative dispositions."' 3 Administrative guidance and the screen-
ing of licenses and approvals receive criticism for being unclear
and arbitrary.33 4 There is also evidence that applications for a
license or approval are left unreviewed for an indefinite period
or are rejected without explanation. 335 The APL sets forth rules
to restrict agencies' discretionary authority and obligates them
to provide reasons, in writing when requested, about why they
reject applications or cancel licenses or approvals. 3 6
A. Regulation of Administrative Guidance
The APL is the first statute to specifically address the pro-
cess of administrative guidance.3 3 7 The Third Reform Council,
333. Id. arts. 12-31.
334. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 1-2; SHINDO, supra note 1, at 15-17; Edelman, supra
note 1, at 389; see ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing minis-
tries' ability to arbitrarily delay processing or denying application of non-complying
party).
335. ENIGMA OFJAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing ministries' ability
to hold off processing applications for whatever reason); Happy Slashing, supra note 164,
at 16; see KANEKO, supra note 1, at 31-32 (discussing absence of laws and regulations
designed to force ministries to provide reasons for administrative action prior to APL).
336. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16. One commentator notes that:
The law restricts off-the-cuff government rulings that are disadvantageous to a
party; for example, ones that say your company's permission to sell insurance
is canceled. In the past, agencies often took adverse action without hearing
anything from their prey in advance. Now, parties are entitled to present their
arguments, sometimes even at a formal hearing, before the agency hands
down its decision.
Id. Article 3 states, however, that the law is applicable to administrative actions and
guidance, except where exempted by Art 3(1), which contains sixteen specialized ex-
emptions, including actions by Diet members and courts, settlement, criminal proce-
dures, acts of officers performing duties related to public safety, and immigration and
naturalization procedures. APL art. 3, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Administrative ac-
tions taken by local administrative agencies are also beyond the scope of the APL. Id.
art. 4; K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 119. This exemption was important to gain the
local support for the passage of the APL, because local agencies typically rely heavily on
the use of administrative guidance. Id. Note, however, that Article 38 implores these
agencies to endeavor to adhere to the APL when using administrative guidance. APL
art. 38, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Further, Article 4 exempts actions of the central
government aimed at local authorities Id. art. 4.
337. KANEKO, supra note 1, at 140-41; K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 126. The
APL defines administrative guidance as "guidance, recommendations, advice, or other
acts by which an Administrative Organ may seek, within the scope of its duties or desig-
nated functions, certain feasance or non-feasance on the part of specified persons in
order to realize administrative aims, where such acts are not Dispositions." APL art.
2(6), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The "designated functions" of an administrative
organ, or agency, are those specifically found in the enabling statutes that initially estab-
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in its report and draft APL, noted that the administrative gui-
dance process preserves flexibility and enhances the ease and
speed of implementing regulations.3 3 8  The Council criticized
the process of administrative guidance, however, because it risks
rendering the rule of law meaningless and fosters opaqueness in
administrative and regulatory processes.3 3 9 The Council added
that foreign criticism that cited administrative guidance as a
trade barrier was increasing as Japan's economy became more
enmeshed in the global economy. 340 The Council, therefore,
submitted its recommendations for rules to formalize agencies'
use of administrative guidance. 41
The APL's purpose is to clarify rules regarding the process
called administrative guidance, not to abolish the process it-
self.34" The APL contains provisions that codify principles of
transparency regarding the use of administrative guidance. 43 As
a general principle, an administrative agency cannot exceed its
jurisdiction when issuing guidance.3 44 Any use of guidance must
lished the agency. Mark Levin, Administrative Procedure Act: Translated and Annotated, 25
L. IN JAPAN 141, 144 n.3 (1995) [hereinafter APA Annotated].
338. Third Reform Council Report, supra note 321, at 350. See Nakayama, supra note
300, at 8 (discussing merits and demerits of administrative guidance process).
339. Third Reform Council Report, supra note 321, at 352.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Yoshinobu Kitamura, Gyosei Tetsuzuki Hosei Jidai no fichitai Gyosei [Municipal
Administration in the Administrative Procedures Law Age], KjKAN GYOSEI KANRI [ADMINISTRA-
TWE MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY], Mar. 15, 1995, at 27. Early debate regarding the draft-
ing of an APL noted that the most serious problem was making regulatory administra-
tive guidance more equitable. Gyosei tetsuzuki ho - horitsu yoko(an) [1985 Report of the
Administrative Procedure Law Study Commission: Bill Outline (Tentative)], translated in 19 L.
INJAPAN 93, 121 (1986) [hereinafter APL Study Commission]. The Commission chose to
adopt the concept of "relying on writings and included the required provisions for spe-
cific forms, methods of delivery, petitions for delivery of writings by the recipient, rec-
ord-keeping, and so forth." Id. The Commission included opportunities to present
arguments, especially where guidance worked to the disadvantage of the recipient
party. Id.
343. APL arts. 32-36, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). This section of the APL draws
both praise and criticism. Izumi, supra note 305, at 7. Supporters contend that the
clarified procedures will erase the arbitrary use of administrative guidance. Id. In addi-
tion, "clarifying the basic principles may be understood as a powerful signal to the ad-
ministrative bodies to respect the boundaries of law and may be helpful to citizens when
opposing a nonstatutory request by an administrative body." K6dderitzsch, supra note
148, at 127. Critics believe including procedures for administrative guidance in the
APL will have the effect of authorizing a system that lacks a legal basis. Id.
344. APL art. 32(1), Law No. 88 of 1993. The APL seeks to ensure that an agency's
use of administrative guidance remains strictly within the scope of the duties and func-
tions of the administrative agency. Id.
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include the purpose, contents, and name of the issuing offi-
cial.345 In cases of oral guidance, 4 6 the agency, upon request 347
by the recipient party, shall provide the guidance in writing.34
8
The APL focuses principally on the criticism that, in many cases
of administrative guidance, the content and purpose of the gui-
dance and the agency responsible for the guidance are deliber-
ately left vague. 49
The APL's rules concerning administrative guidance also
emphasize the voluntary nature of the guidance.35 ° Under the
APL, a party's non-compliance may not disadvantageously affect
guidance recipients.5 1 In this context, the APL stipulates that
parties that do not comply with guidance may not be treated un-
fairly or be pressured by the ministry in this or other unrelated
matters also within the ministry's jurisdiction.5 2 Agency officials
345. Id. art. 35(1). "Persons imposing Administrative Guidance shall make clear to
the subject party the purpose and content of, and the parties responsible for, the Ad-
ministrative Guidance in question." Id.
346. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 110. Most administrative guidance is oral.
Id.
347. APL art. 35(2), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The burden to request guidance
in writing falls on the recipient party. APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 26. The individual
recipient party must take the initiative and request the contents of the guidance in
writing. Id.
348. APL art. 35(2), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The guidance must be in writing
when requested, except in cases where written guidance would cause "extraordinary
administrative inconvenience." Id. Written guidance requests shall not apply to in-
stances where "on the spot" guidance requires the immediate actions of the party. Id.
art. 35(3) (1). These requests shall also not apply to guidance where the party has previ-
ously received written notification. Id. art. 35(3) (2).
349. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 127-28.
350. APL art. 32(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). "[T]he substance of the Admin-
istrative Guidance is, to the utmost degree, realized based solely upon the voluntary
cooperation of the subject party." Id.
351. Id. art 32(2). "Persons imposing Administrative Guidance shall not treat the
subjects of Administrative Guidance disadvantageously owing to the subjects' non-com-
pliance with the Administrative Guidance in question." Id.
352. Id. arts. 33-34. Regarding guidance that seeks modification or withdrawal of
an application, "persons imposing Administrative Guidance shall not act in disregard of
an applicant's manifestation that he or she has no intent to comply with the Administra-
tive Guidance in question to obstruct the applicant's exercise of rights by conduct such
as continuing the Administrative Guidance in question." Id. art. 33. Persons imposing
guidance from agencies, that have the authority to grant permission or render disposi-
tions denying such permission but which are unable to or have no intent to exercise its
authority, may not engage in conduct to force compliance by either deliberately or
misleadingly suggesting that they are capable of exercising said authority. Id. art. 34.
In other words, "when a ministry is unable to exercise authority over the approval or
denial of a license or permit or when the ministry has no intent to exercise such author-
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must provide explanations for rejected applications and may no
longer threaten to deny licenses, permits, or approvals in order
to effect compliance with the agency's administrative goals. 53
B. Codification of Administrative Processes
The APL includes criteria for processing applications for
government permits and licenses.3 54 There is evidence of cases
where potential applicants are unable to discern the proper
steps in the application process because the process is not codi-
fied, or parties' applications are rejected for no reason or left
unaccepted for an indefinite period. 5 Notifications are techni-
cally submitted to notify agencies of action the company plans to
take.35 6 In Japan, however, agencies refuse to accept receipt of a
notification and use administrative guidance to alter the content
of the action described in the notification. 57 Agencies also re-
voke permits and approvals with no explanation, adding another
element of arbitrariness to administrative procedure in Japan.35 s
The APL's procedures are designed to constrain the ability of
agencies to compel compliance through implied threats regard-
ing applications, notifications, and adverse dispositions.359 The
APL implores agencies to create and publish standards for ac-
cepting and judging applications, accepting notifications, ren-
dering adverse dispositions 3 ° and for allowing parties the op-
portunity to respond to an impending disposition, either in a
formal hearing or in writing.3 61
ity, it cannot use its perceived authority as leverage to force an applicant to obey admin-
istrative guidance." Boling, supra note 7, at 15. One problem with administrative gui-
dance is that it obscures responsibility. Koseki, supra note 297, at 14. "Operators have
no way of knowing whether the demand comes from the ministry, the bureau or just
the official with whom he is talking." Id.
353. Boling, supra note 7, at 15.
354. APL arts. 5-11, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
355. APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 4 fn 1.
356. Id. at 27.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 24-26 (discussing need for adverse disposition rules in Japanese admin-
istrative system).
359. APL arts. 5-11, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
360. Id. arts. 12-14; see Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16 (discussing relatively
large number of agencies that have complied with this request); see generally APL
DATABOOK, supra note 316, at 91-314 (compiling newly clarified procedures).
361. APL arts. 15-31, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
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1. Disposition of Applications
The APL's application procedures are designed to increase
fairness and transparency, as well as expedite the process of ap-
plying for licenses, permits, and approvals.362 The Third Reform
Council reported in 1991 that in order to develop public trust in
the bureaucracy, the application process must be transparent. 36 3
The Council also emphasized the importance of standard filing
procedures and time-periods in order to increase predictability
and efficiency in the application process.364
The APL's provisions regarding applications address the
previous problems involving the application process.3 65 Past crit-
icism focused on the lack of transparency in application
processes and long processing periods for licenses.36 6 Agencies
must now adopt and publicize3 67 application standards. 68 In ad-
dition, the APL calls for agencies to adopt standard periods for
the review of applications and to publicize them along with the
application standards.3 69 These standards should be posted at
the office designated to receive the application. Upon receipt
362. See KANEKO, supra note 1, at 68-107 (analyzing APL's application provisions).
363. Third Reform Council Report, supra note 321, at 350-51.
364. Id. at 351.
365. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 119.
366. Id. Rather than flatly rejecting applications, agencies often try to convince
parties to alter or withdraw them. Id. Agencies pressure applicants by not formally
accepting the application, thus not beginning the review process or suspending the
review process indefinitely at a later stage. Id. The APL's rules regarding applications
are specifically designed to alleviate this problem. Id.
367. APL art. 5(3), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The law exempts agencies in cases
where publication would result in extraordinary administrative inconvenience. Id.
368. Id. art. 5(1)-(3).
369. Id. art. 6. The measured time for the standard review period begins from the
time the application arrives at the administrative office and continues until the time a
disposition is rendered. Id. This definition is designed to take into consideration the
agencies' standard operating procedure in dealing with applications, where agencies
delay processing an application or do not act on them at all. Happy Slashing, supra note
148, at 16. Because there were no formal time guidelines or rules stating that agencies
must begin processing an application immediately upon receipt at the agencies' office,
the APL stipulates that agencies must begin processing applications immediately. APL
art. 7, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Establishing a time frame allows parties to know
when to start inquiring or complaining. Mark Levin, Bureaucratic Sumo Wrestling, AsIAN
L.J., Feb. 1995, at 17 [hereinafter Sumo Wrestling].
370. APL art. 6, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). After establishing standard process-
ing periods, agencies "shall make them available to the public by means of posting them
at the administrative office which is designated to receive the subject Applications or by
some other appropriate method." Id.
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of an application, the agency must begin to review the contents
without delay. 371 When an agency receives a non-conforming ap-
plication, it must promptly 72 notify the applicant and provide a
suitable... time limit for the correction to be made. 74
When an agency rejects an application for a license or ap-
proval, it must indicate the reasons for the denial.373 Prior to the
APL, agencies threatened to deny applications in order to gain
compliance with their administrative guidance because agencies
could arbitrarily deny applications.3 76 According to the APL, the
reasons for denial must be clear, in writing, and must state what
modifications are necessary to gain approval if re-submitted.377
2. Notifications
Many laws in Japan require parties to submit prior notifica-
tion of any action the parties plan to take. 78 Prior to the APL,
however, notifications were treated the same as applications. 9
Japanese agencies would mail back a party's notification un-
opened and issued administrative guidance seeking the party to
alter the conduct about which the party was notifying the
agency.3 80 Agencies, thus, refused to accept notifications and in-
dicated that as long as the party did not comply with certain re-
371. Id. art. 7. "Upon the arrival of an Application at the administrative offices of
an administrative agency, the agency shall commence its review of the Application with-
out delay .... " Id.
372. Id. art. 7. In cases of non-conforming applications, the APL Article 7 stipu-
lates that "the agency shall promptly.., request the persons who filed the Application
... to correct the Application." Id.
373. Id. The APL stipulates that in cases of non-conforming applications, agencies
must "specify a suitable time limit for such correction to be made or deny the permis-
sion, etc. sought by the application." Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. art. 8(1). "Administrative agencies shall, in cases where they render Dispo-
sitions denying the permission, etc. sought by Applications, concurrently set forth rea-
sons for the subject Disposition." Id. The APL exempts agencies from this requirement
if the guidelines for the application process are clear and already public knowledge. Id.
In these cases, reasons are provided only upon request of the applicant. Id.
376. See ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, supra note 6, at 450 (discussing ministries'
discretionary use of licensing authority to achieve compliance with other unrelated mat-
ters).
377. Id.
378. Sumo Wrestling, supra note 369, at 18.
379. Id. "Japanese agencies are renowned for transforming notice requirements
into defacto discretionary approvals by refusing to accept filings until the involved party
agrees to comply with some conditions that the agency wishes to impose." Id.
380. Id.
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quirements the notification would remain unaccepted."' This
bureaucratic practice transformed the statutory requirement of
submitting notification to a government agency into a de facto
licensing requirement byjudging the acceptability of a particular
notification based on its contents. 38 2 The APL addresses this
practice and states that notifications from parties to the adminis-
tration, like applications, 3 3 are effective upon receipt at the des-
ignated agency's office.3 84
3. Adverse Disposition Procedures
The APL's goals regarding adverse38 5 dispositions are to en-
sure notice to parties and provide an opportunity for parties to
present arguments against the disposition prior to cancellation
or suspension of a permit or license.3" 6 The Third Reform
Council determined that a uniform system was necessary to en-
sure fairness and equal treatment because differing review stan-
dards for similar applications had evolved among various agen-
cies.387 The APL articulates procedures for general rules regard-
381. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 128.
382. Id. "Frequently and systematically, the statutory requirements of notification
are de facto transformed into a licensing requirement." Id. One commentator notes
thatJapan cannot achieve real deregulation unless the notification and application sys-
tems are changed so that agencies no longer have the discretionary authority to delay
acting on a party's application or notification. APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 27.
383. APL art. 6, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Applications are complete and the
time frame for processing applications begins when applications are received at the
relevant administrative office. Id.
384. Id. art. 37. Article 37 states:
Where Notifications conform to requirements that the contents of notification
form be in order and the notification form be appended with necessary docu-
ments, and to other pro forma requirements provided by Statutes, procedural
requirements for filing the Notification in question shall be fulfilled upon its
arrival at the administrative office of the organ designated by Statutes to re-
ceive the Notification in question.
Id.
385. Id. art. 2. "Adverse Dispositions refer to Dispositions in which administrative
agencies, acting pursuant to Statutes, designate specified persons as subject parties to
the Disposition and directly impose duties upon them or limit their rights .. " Id. In
other words, adverse dispositions refer to government actions that suspend, revoke, or
cancel a previously granted license, permit, or approval. Happy Slashing, supra note 164,
at 16.
386. APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 11; Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16
(describing agencies' past practice of taking adverse action with no notice or hearing).
387. Boling, supra note 7, at 14. The Reform Council noted that procedures ex-
isted under a number of different laws, resulting in varying procedures for similar appli-
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ing review standards for issuing adverse dispositions,388
statement of reasons for that action,3 89 and rules concerning the
opportunity for potential recipients of adverse dispositions to
present arguments prior to the final disposition.39 °
a. General Rules
The APL requests agencies to endeavor 391 to enact stan-
dards39 2 for judging whether adverse dispositions should be ren-
dered.393 The agencies must attempt to make such standards
public knowledge.394 The APL implores government agencies to
make these standards as specific and unambiguous as possi-
ble.3 95 The APL requires agencies rendering adverse disposi-
tions to provide the recipient with the reasons for the disposi-
tion.39 6
b. Opportunity To Be Heard
Prior to issuing an adverse disposition, the APL stipulates
cations. Third Reform Council Report, supra note 321, at 350. A unifying legal regime was,
therefore, necessary. Boling, supra note 7, at 14.
388. APL art. 12, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
389. Id. art. 14.
390. Id. arts. 15-31.
391. Id. art. 12. Article 12 states that:
Administrative agencies shall endeavor to enact standards ... such standards
being necessary for judging, in accordance with the provisions of relevant Stat-
utes, whether Adverse Dispositions shall be rendered, and as the case may be,
what kind of Adverse Dispositions shall be rendered, and the agencies shall
endeavor to make such standards available to the public.
Id. art. 12(1).
392. Id. The standards referred to in this provision are "[d]isposition
[s] tandards," and refer to agency decisions regarding renewal or revocation of licenses,
approvals, and permits. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. Article 12(1) states that "agencies shall endeavor to make such standards
available to the public." Id.
395. Id. art. 12(2). Agencies, in creating disposition standards, "shall make them
as concrete as possible in light of the nature of the particular Adverse Disposition in
question." Id.
396. Id. art. 14(1). Agencies, however, do not have to give reasons when there are
compelling needs. Id. According to the APL, "[a] t the time of rendering Adverse Dis-
positions, administrative agencies shall indicate to the subject parties the reasons there-
for; provided however, the preceding shall not apply when there are compelling needs
for rendering Adverse Dispositions without setting forth the reasons concerned." Id.
In cases where there are compelling needs, however, the APL requires that reasons
must be provided within an appropriate period of time after rendering the disposition.
Id. art. 14(2).
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that the concerned party must first be granted an opportunity to
explain their petition and hear the agency's reasons for the dis-
position.397 The APL requires agencies to establish procedures
for hearing statements and arguments of persons who will be-
come the subject of an adverse disposition. 398 Applications,
meanwhile, are exempted from the hearing procedures estab-
lished by the APL.39 9 Rejected applications are not adverse dis-
positions to which the hearing procedures apply.40 0 If an appli-
cation is denied or conditionally approved, only the application
procedures in Articles 5 to 11401 apply, not the procedures for
adverse dispositions in Articles 15 to 31.402
The APL delineates two categories of hearing procedures
regarding adverse dispositions.40 3 All adverse dispositions, with
the exception of certain more serious cases, are subject to infor-
mal, written hearing procedures.40 4 The APL requires formal
hearings in cases involving revocation of a license, infringement
of a legal position other than a license, dispositions that affect
the status of executive officers or special legal persons, and any
other instances where the relevant agency deems formal pro-
ceedings necessary.40 5 In cases involving lighter sanctions, the
APL requires less formal rules for presenting opinions and hear-
ing reasons prior to the rendering of adverse dispositions.
4 6
397. Id. art. 14(1).
398. Id. art. 13(1). Article 13(l)(1) provides for formal hearings in certain cases.
Id. art. 13(1) (1) (a)-(d). Examples include cases where an adverse disposition revokes a
permission or other previously conferred qualification or status. Id. art. 13(1)(1)(a).
399. APA Annotated, supra note 337, at 143 n2; Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at
16. Procedures for adverse dispositions apply in cases where unfavorable dispositions
are rendered unless an exception applies. APL art. 2(4), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
One of the four listed exceptions includes "[d]ispositions which deny the permission,
etc. requested by Applications and other Dispositions that are rendered based upon
applications and which specifically designate those who made the Applications as the
subject of the Disposition." Id. art. 2(4) (b).
400. APA Annotated, supra note 337, at 143 n.2; Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at
16.
401. APL arts. 5-11, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
402. Id. arts. 15-31.
403. Krdderitzsch, supra note 148, at 124.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. APL art. 13, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). In certain cases, agencies do not
have to provide for a formal hearing regarding an adverse disposition. Id. art. 13(1) (2).
When none of the circumstances outlined in Article 13 (1) (1) apply, agencies must only
grant parties the opportunity for an explanation and rebuttal, as opposed to the formal
hearing prescribed in Article 13(1)(1). Id. This includes where it is necessary for an
1996] JAPAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES LAW
The procedures concerning formal hearings are enumerated in
the APL.407 Where a party is not provided a formal hearing, the
agency to render a disposition quickly for the public interest and the procedures re-
quired by Article 13(1)(1) cannot be implemented in time. Id. art. 13(2)(1). Also
included are cases where an adverse disposition is necessary after an agency realizes that
despite initial approval the party did not actually meet, or no longer meets, the statu-
tory requirements for that approval. Id. art. 13(2)(2). Proof of the existence of this
situation must be in the form of a written judicial judgment or decree, or by written
documentation by one empowered with granting or denying such approval. Id. An-
other exemption from the formal hearing requirement includes cases where the opera-
tions in question should, but do not, accord with certain technical standards. Id. art.
13(2) (3). In these cases, the adverse disposition is rendered to order compliance and
the agency confirms evidence of non-conformance by measurement or some other ob-
jective method. Id. Dispositions ordering payment of money owed, or which retract a
decision to pay money or otherwise restrict payment do not require a hearing. Id. art.
13(2) (4). The APL also exempts adverse dispositions specified by Cabinet Order as not
subject to the hearing requirement. Id. art. 13(2) (5). This exemption only covers cases
where the disposition imposes slight duties. Id. The APL provides that parties have the
opportunity to hear and rebut an agencies' decision to deny a formal hearing after the
agency determines that the particular subject matter falls outside the scope of Article
13. Id. art. 13(1)(1).
407. See Id. arts. 15-28 (listing APL's adverse disposition hearing procedures).
Agencies must provide notice to the parties. Id. art. 15. Notice includes the date and
time of the hearing and any other relevant information. Id. Parties may designate, in
writing, agents capable of performing on behalf of the parties in all respects. Id. art. 16.
All references in the APL to a party's rights or obligations applies equally to any desig-
nated agent. Id. Parties may request an inspection of the agencies' records docu-
menting results of investigations or other materials relevant to the subject matter on
which the disposition will be based, and agencies may not deny these requests unless
there is a risk of harm to the interests of a third party or for some other justifiable
reason. Id. art. 18; APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 13. An official presides over the for-
mal hearing. APL art. 19(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). This section also lists ineligi-
ble parties who may not preside, including interested parties, spouses, relatives, and
parties' agents. Id. arts. 19(2)(1)-19(2) (6). Agency officials, when directed by the pre-
siding official, must explain the contents of the proposed adverse disposition and the
relevant statutes on which the decision is based. Id. art. 20(1). Parties can express their
views and present documentary evidence at the hearing. Id. art. 20(2). Parties and
agents, pursuant to Article 21, may submit written arguments and evidence instead of
appearing in person. Id. art. 21. Parties failing to either appear in person or submit
written arguments by the hearing date are barred from any further opportunity to ex-
press their views. Id. art. 23(1). This hearing is closed to the public except when the
agency decides otherwise. Id. art. 20(6); APL THEORY, supra note 1, at 12. Upon com-
pletion of the hearing, the presiding official draws up a record of the proceedings,
indicating the essential points of the party's arguments, and writes an opinion regard-
ing the efficacy of the party's argument compared to the rationale for the anticipated
adverse disposition. APL art. 24, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Consistent with Article
18, parties and agents may demand inspection of the official's reports. Id. art. 24(4).
The presiding official then submits the opinion to the relevant administrative agency.
Id. art. 24(3). If necessary, agencies may direct the presiding official to reopen a formal
hearing by returning the official report to the presiding official. Id. art. 25. The APL
allows this reopening option when necessary in light of information or circumstances
1739)
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APL provides for the opportunity to submit a statement of expla-
nation and rebuttal.40 8
Following a formal hearing, the presiding official4"9 writes
and submits a report to the agency, including all relevant materi-
als and the official's recommendation. 410 Parties may request in-
spection of the report prior to the agency's decision.41 1 The issu-
ing agency is required to consider the presiding official's opin-
ion prior to issuing an adverse disposition.4 12 Once an adverse
disposition is issued following a hearing, it cannot be appealed
under the Administrative Complaint Investigation Law
("ACIL") .41
C. MITI and MOF Reactions to the APL
Ministries and businesses reacted immediately to the APL's
enactment. 414 In the year interim period between the APL's
which arise after the hearing's conclusion. Id. The APL requires agencies to delay
their decision to issue an adverse disposition until after careful consideration of the
hearing record and the official opinion. Id. art. 24(3). Regarding the appeals process,
Article 27 bars the use of the ACIL to raise administrative appeals challenging disposi-
tions. Id. art. 27(1). Requests for reconsideration are also barred under the ACIL. Id.
art. 27(2). Article 28 contains special provisions that stipulate a formal hearing for
adverse dispositions ordering dismissals of government officers. Id. art. 28(1)-(2)
408. APL art. 29(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The statement is to be in writing,
unless the administrative agency authorizes an oral presentation. Documentary evi-
dence may also be submitted at this time. Id. art. 29(2). As with the formal hearing,
the agency must give the party written notice of certain information regarding the an-
ticipated adverse disposition. Id. art. 30. Notice must allow time for the party to submit
their statement of explanation and rebuttal. Id. Article 31 provides that Articles 15 and
16, regarding notice and use of agents in the formal hearing, also apply to the state-
ment of explanation and rebuttal. Id. art. 31.
409. Id. art. 19.
410. Id. art. 24.
411. Id. art. 24(4).
412. Id. art. 26. "In deciding to issue an Adverse Disposition, administrative agen-
cies shall do so only after careful consideration of the contents of the record provided
for in Article 24, paragraph 1 and of the opinion of the presiding official entered in the
report drafted pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same Article." Id.
413. Id. art. 27. One commentator notes that:
The APL's prohibition of appeals of unfavorable dispositions under the Ad-
ministrative Complaints Inquiry Law is a tremendous disappointment. The
fingerprints of bureaucrats are clearly discernible here. The unavailability of
appeal significantly strengthens the hand of the bureaucrats during the li-
cense or permit revocation process. Although the applicant has the right to
request a hearing, the leverage of appeal to a higher body is absent.
Boling, supra note 7, at 7.
414. Uga Interview, supra note 322 (noting events involving APL following soon
after law's enactment); Yoshio Suzuki, Shiitekina gyosei shido ni taikou suru kirifuda [Trump
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1993 enactment and the 1994 start date, government agencies
promulgated clarified procedural guidelines to comply with
standards articulated in the APL. 415  Businesses in Japan, em-
boldened by the enactment of the APL and its constraints on
administrative guidance, acted contrary to administrative gui-
dance.416 Some businesses, without seeking prior ministerial ap-
proval, offered new products and services that were previously
barred by administrative guidance.4"7 In addition, market access
negotiations within the ongoing U.S.-Japan Framework Talks418
in 1994 and 1995 led to new trade measures in insurance and
financial services that incorporated the language and principles
of the APL.419
Card to Oppose Arbitrary Administrative Guidance], EKONOMISUTO, May 8, 1995, at 70 [here-
inafter Trump Card] (detailing early use of APL against administrative guidance). An
incident involving MITI's rejection of a gas company's application and subsequent issu-
ance of administrative guidance began on October 1, 1994, the official start date of the
APL. Gasujigyosha no shinseisho o kyohi [Gas Company's Application Rejected], NIHON KEIZAI
SHIMBUN, Nov. 23, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Application Rejected]; City Gas Company Accuses
MITI of Excessive Regulatory Hand, NIKKEI WiLv., Nov. 28, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter City Gas
Company]; see WHY CAN'T JAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232-33 (discussing
MITI's rejection of gas company's application for expanded service area). In addition,
several banks ignored MOF's administrative guidance and started offering previously
banned savings accounts shortly after enactment of the APL. Kaoru Morishita, Lottery
Bank Accounts Stir Super-Furor, NIrEI WKL,., Nov. 21, 1994, at 16 [hereinafter Lottery
Bank Accounts]; Yoshio Suzuki, Kanryo shihai ni kazaana o aketa gyosei tetsuzuki ho [The
Administrative Procedures Law Opens Airhole in Bureaucratic Control], EKONOMISUTO, Dec.
27, 1994, at 44 [hereinafter APL Opens Airhole]. In the year interim period between the
enactment date and the date the APL took effect, over 2000 government agencies, their
local offices, and municipalities reviewed their administrative processes and promul-
gated new directives and guidelines designed to bring processes up to the APL's stan-
dards of formality and transparency. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16.
415. Happy Slashing, supra note 164, at 16; see generally APL DATAOOK, supra note
316, at 91-314 (compiling all new directives, guidelines, and procedures of national
agencies and local municipalities promulgated to coincide with APL's official start date
on October 1, 1994).
416. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3;
WHY CAN'T JAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232-33.
417. Lottery Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16; APL Opens Airhole, supra note 414,
at 44.
418. See Japan-United States: Joint Statement on the Framework for a New Eco-
nomic Partnership, Sept. 1993, Japan-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1414, 1418 [hereinafter Frame-
work Statement] (discussing regulatory reform in United States andJapan). "Measures
undertaken in this area will address reform of relevant government laws, regulations,
and guidance which have the effect of substantially impeding market access for compet-
itive foreign goods and services, including financial services, insurance, competition
policy, transparent procedures, and distribution." Id. at 1418.
419. Japan-United States: Measures Regarding Insurance, Oct. 1, 1994,Japan-U.S.,
34 I.L.M. 661 [hereinafter Insurance Measures]; Japan-United States: Measures Re-
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1. Promulgation of Clarified Guidelines
The APL calls for agencies to promulgate newly clarified
guidelines and procedures.4 20 The Japanese Diet took into con-
sideration that it would take time for this process and set the
start date approximately one year after passage in the Diet.4 21
MITI issued a press release explaining, inter alia, new rules con-
cerning the use of administrative guidance.422 MITI and MOF
publicly issued ministerial orders clarifying hearing procedures
regarding adverse dispositions. 423
a. New Rules On Administrative Guidance
On September 27, 1994, MITI issued a press release ("Re-
lease") detailing various changes taking place within MITI in re-
sponse to the impending start date of the APL.424 The Release
announced that new adverse disposition hearing procedures es-
tablished by MITI to comply with the APL appeared in MITI's
Ministerial Order No. 62 of September 28, 1994.425 In addition,
the Release established specific guidelines regarding MITI's use
of administrative guidance. 426
The Release reaffirmed the applicability of APL Article 36427
garding Financial Services, May 1995, Japan-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 617 [hereinafter Financial
Services Measures].
420. APL art. 5, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The requirements of Article 5, in
relevant part, provide that "[a]dminisrative agencies shall enact standards (hereinafter
referred to as 'review standards'), such standards being necessary for judging, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of relevant statutes, whether an application requesting
permission, etc. will be granted." Id.
421. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 105 (discussing APL enactment date and offi-
cial start date one year later).
422. Tsushosangyosho (Kisha Haifu Shiryo) [MITI Press Release], Sept. 27, 1994, re-
printed in APL DATABOOK, supra note 284, at 46 [hereinafter MITI Press Release].
423. Tsushosangyosho Chomon Tetsuzuki Kisoku [MITI Hearing Procedure Rules], Sept.
28, 1994, reprinted in APL DATABOOK, supra note 286, at 149-53 [hereinafter MflTI Order
No. 62]; Okurasho Chomon Tetsuzuki Kisoku [MOF Hearing Procedure Rules], Sept. 30, 1994,
reprinted in APL DATABOOK, supra note 286, at 135-38 [hereinafter MOF Order No. 98].
424. M1TI Press Release, supra note 422, at 46.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 49.
427. APL art. 36, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Article 36 states that:
When an Administrative Organ wishes to render Administrative Guidance to
more than one person by applying standardized conditions in order to achieve
a common administrative objective, then, in advance and in accordance with
the circumstances of the particular case, the Organ shall, establish the con-
tents and matters to be uniformly applied in the Administrative Guidance, and
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to MITI's administrative guidance.42 The Release emphasized
the need for prior notification, description of contents, and pub-.
lication of the names of officials responsible for any administra-
tive guidance.429 It also included an admission that MITI often
enforces its guidance by pressuring industry associations or trade
groups to force a consensus within a particular industry, and that.
such guidance does not always correspond to MITI's actual regu-
latory authority.4 30 In addition, MITI stated that many instances
involving guidance directed at multiple parties require prior offi-
cial pronouncement of the guidelines and reasons for the gui-
dance.43 1 Finally, the Release included MITI's plans to an-
nounce future guidelines regarding administrative guidance in
certain areas.43 2
b. Clarified Hearing Procedures
MITI and MOF issued official statements containing newly
clarified adverse disposition hearing procedures promulgated to
comply with the APL.4 33 The Ministerial Orders ("Orders") state
that adverse dispositions issued by ministry officials shall abide
by the procedures contained within the ministry's particular Or-
der, except where other laws specifically provide for hearing pro-
cedures.4 34 The Orders codify procedures required by the APL,
thereby confirming the APL's applicability to MITI and MOF's
rules governing adverse dispositions.435
Officials presiding over the hearing may request agency offi-
cials, academic or industry experts, and others to serve as wit-
so long as no extraordinary administrative inconvenience arises thereby, make
such matters known to the public.
Id.
428. MITI Press Release, supra note 422, at 49.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. Examples include guidelines regarding product displays and instruction
manuals, as well as other guidelines concerning Japan's new product liability law. Id.
433. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149-53; MOF Order No. 98, supra note
423, at 135-38.
434. MJTI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149-53; MOF Order No. 98, supra note
423, at 135-39.
435. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149-53; MOF Order No. 98, supra note
423, at 135-39.
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nesses.4 "6 Interested parties, when due to uncontrollable cir-
cumstances, may also request a change of date or location of the
hearing.437 In cases where the agency grants this request, the
Orders require the agency to provide notice to the party and
other participants in the hearing.4 8 In addition, parties wanting
to use an agent43 9 in the hearing procedures must notify the pre-
siding official of these plans at least two weeks prior to the hear-
ing and is subject to the official's approval." ° Notice of this de-
cision must be provided to the interested party. 441
A party requesting to inspect agency records, pursuant to
APL Article 18(1),442 must submit a written request including
name, address, and materials to be inspected." The selection
of the presiding official must be decided prior to the date that
notice of the hearing is provided." 4 Pursuant to the APL's Arti-
cle notice requirements, 445 the name of the presiding official
must be included in the notice statement." 6 Ministries may re-
place a presiding official pursuant to the ministry's general au-
thority."47 There is an obligation to replace officials in cases
where conflicts of interest exist pursuant to APL Article 19,"8
however, notice is required for any and all replacements. 4 9
Agencies must post the date, time, and place of hearings
436. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
137.
437. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
135.
438. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
135.
439. APL art. 17, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
440. MJTI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
441. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 149; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
442. APL art. 18(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
443. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 150; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
444. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 150; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
445. APL art. 15, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
446. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 150; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
447. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 150; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
136.
448. APL art. 19, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
449. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 150; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
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that are open to the public, as well as provide notice to all inter-
ested parties.450 Pursuant to APL Article 21 (1),451 parties may
submit written arguments and evidence, which must include the
party's name, address, and case name and do not appear in per-.
son.45 2 After the conclusion of the hearing, the presiding official
must submit to the agency a completed and signed report of the
hearing, including all statements, evidence, pictures, and other
materials the official deems appropriate.455 Parties must include
their name, address, and case name when requesting to view the
presiding official's final report.454
2. Increased Business Conviction and Tentative Reaction From
Ministries
In the wake of the APL's enactment, several Japanese com-
panies adopted a less deferential approach to ministries' use of
administrative guidance.455 Public criticism of MITI's adminis-
trative guidance by Keidanren,456 a major pro-business lobby, has
aided at least one firm in its successful request to expand its ser-
vice area, despite receiving administrative guidance to the con-
trary.457 In the financial sector, several banks have capitalized on
the APL's enactment by utilizing methods of attracting new cus-
450. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 151; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
137.
451. APL art. 21(1), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). "Parties ... in lieu of appearing
on the assigned date of a formal hearing, submit written arguments and documentary
evidence, etc. to the presiding official on or before the assigned date of the formal
hearing." Id.
452. MJTI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 151; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
137.
453. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 151-52; MOF Order No. 98, supra note
423, at 138.
454. MITI Order No. 62, supra note 423, at 152; MOF Order No. 98, supra note 423, at
138.
455. Uga Interview, supra note 322 (discussing Amakusa gas company and Jonan
Shinkin bank acting contrary to traditional guidance in wake of APL's enactment).
456. City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3. Keidanren, Japan's Federation of Eco-
nomic Organizations, is the most influential business lobby. Id. The group has been
lobbying for deregulation and transparency in regulatory matters. Id. They have also
established a phone and fax hotline for companies receiving administrative guidance.
Id.; Keidanren ga "Cyosei shido 110 ban" [Keidanren's Dial 110 Hotline], NIHON KEIZAi
SHIMBUN, Oct. 1, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter 110 Hotline]. Keidanren, therefore, publicly
criticizes MITI for resorting to extra-legal guidance and supports businesses in resisting
administrative guidance. Id.
457. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3;
WHY CAN'T JAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232-33.
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tomers which were previously banned by administrative gui-
dance.458 Whereas MOF traditionally issued guidance to prevent
banks from breaking from established operating methods, when
the banks began offering the prohibited products and services,
MOF reacted tentatively by setting up a group to study the is-
sue. 
4 5 9
a. Amakusa Gas Company, Keidanren, and MITI
A recent incident involving MITI and the Amakusa Gas
Company illustrates the initial impact of the APL on MITI's mar-
ket governance. 460  A controversy began on October 1, 1994,
when a propane gas supplier first submitted its petition to MITI
for an expanded service area.4 61 Local MITI officials directed
the company to consult in advance with competing propane gas
companies that would be affected by this move.4 62 MITI refused
to act on Amakusa's application for expanded service without an
attached report documenting negotiations with the local compe-
tition.4 6' The gas company officials asked the ministry to put
this request in writing464 but MITI refused.465 Amakusa re-sub-
mitted its application,466 and informed Keidanren,4 6 7 which noti-
458. Lottery Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16; APL Opens Airhole, supra note 414,
at 44.
459. Lottery Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16; APL Opens Airhole, supra note 414,
at 44.
460. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3;
see WHY CAN'TJAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232-33 (discussing MITI's rejection
of gas company's application for expanded service area).
461. David Hulme, A Victory for Transparency, ASIAN Bus., Feb. 1995, at 12; Applica-
tion Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3.
462. WHY CAN'TJAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232; Hulme, supra note 461,
at 12.
463. wY CA.N'TJAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 232-33; Application Rejected,
supra note 414, at 5. MITI protects small and mid-size propane gas companies by infor-
mally directing larger companies to negotiate in advance if they want to expand their
service area. City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3.
464. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3.
The APL obligates agencies, when requested by parties, to present to the recipient of
the guidance the purpose, content, and parties responsible for the administrative gui-
dance. APL art. 35(2), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan); Application Rejected, supra note 414,
at 5.
465. WHY CAN'TJAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 233.
466. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3;
WHY CAN'T JAPAN DEREGULATE, supra note 202, at 233.
467. Application Rejected, supra note 414, at 5; City Gas Company, supra note 414, at 3.
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fled MITI of its position in support of Amakusa.468 Keidanren
called for MITI to comply with the newly enacted APL.4 69 MITI
ultimately changed its mind and approved the firm's applica-
tion, thus avoiding further conflict.47 °
Keidanren, a quasi-public group traditionally operating to
help MITI govern industries, 471 recently shifted gears in support
of deregulating Japan's markets and improving transparency in
regulatory processes.472 Keidanren now supports recipients of
non-transparent or unfair guidance by publicizing the guidance
and lobbying on behalf of the recipient party.473 The group set
up a phone and fax hotline on October 1, 1994, when the APL
went into effect.4 74 Companies may now call to report receipt of
administrative guidance from ministries, 475 and Keidanren vows
to support the companies against the bureaucracy.4 76
b. Lottery-Based Bank Accounts and MOF
Following MOF's deregulation of interest rates on October
17, 1994, the Jonan Shinkin Bank broke with tradition 477 and
468. 110 Hotline, supra note 456, at 3.
469. Id.
470. Id. MITI, however, denied it violated the new APL law. City Gas Company,
supra note 414, at 3.
471. See OMIYA, supra note 122, at 193-95 (discussing traditional role of Keidanren
and its influence in helping MITI govern manufacturing sector); City Gas Company,
supra note 414, at 3 (describing Keidanren's transformation into pro-deregulation
lobby group).
472. Hulme, supra note 461, at 12. Keidanren recently underwent a "dramatic
metamorphosis to position itself as the champion of deregulation..." and is supporting
the business community against the government. Id.
473. Id.
474. 110 Hotline, supra note 456, at 3; Government Rescinds "Administrative Guidance"
in 3 Cases, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
CURNWS File [hereinafter Government Rescinds Guidance].
475. 110 Hotline, supra note 456, at 3. Keidanren urges recipients of the bureau-
cracy's non-transparent or unfair administrative guidance to report the guidance to
Keidanren. Id. The hotline represents Keidanren's policy shift in support of deregula-
tion. Id. Keidanren reported several cases where guidance was rescinded because of
their support against the ministries. Government Rescinds Guidance, supra note 474. The
group reports that they have received over 30 calls on the phone hotline. Id.
476. 110 Hotline, supra note 456, at 3.
477. Suki Tsukareta? Okurasho yoso gai no hankyo ni tomadoi [Unexpected Attack? MOF
Uncomfortable With Bank's Unanticipated Response], NIHON KEIzA SHIMBUN, Nov. 10, 1994,
at 7 [hereinafter Unexpected Attack]. This was a departure from the standard procedure
of seeking prior approval from MOF for new products or services. Id. In the past,
Jonan could not have offered its lottery accounts without explicit ministry approval.
Lottey Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16. The MOF traditionally controlled the bank-
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started offering lottery-based savings accounts. 478 Despite receiv-
ing sharp criticism from other banks and the banking trade asso-
ciation, the Jonan Bank made a large profit and several other
banks soon offered similar products.479 Rather than issuing ad-
ministrative guidance, MOF formed a commission to study the
issue.4 8° Media reports and academic commentary attribute the
banks' action and MOF's inaction to the recently enacted
APL.48'
ing industry through informal guidance. APL Opens Airhole, supra note 414, at 44.
Banks would normally seek approval and the entire industry would then act in concert.
Id "The deeply-rooted 'protection-regulation' relationship with the controlling minis-
try" guaranteed uniformity in products and services offered by the various financial
institutions as well as the institutions' continued existence. Eiichiro Iwasa, Deregulation
- It's in the Balance, LOOKJAPAN, Mar. 1995, at 6.
478. Suupaa Teiki ni Kenshokin [Super Fixed Term Lottery], NIHON KEiZAI SHIMBUN,
Nov. 7, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Fixed Term Lottery]; Iwasa, supra note 477, at 6. Nearly a
month after the interest rate liberalization, the Jonan Bank began offering chances to
win a lottery prize equal to approximately US$500 for customers holding deposit ac-
counts of more than US$1000. Id.; Fixed Term Lottery, supra, at 1.
479. Fixed Term Lottery, supra note 478, at 1. The bank made more than US$1 bil-
lion in new accounts in 20 working days. Id. The other banks following Jonan's lead
included Shonan Shinkin Bank, Kyoto Chuo Shinkin Bank, and Cosmo Bank. Lottery
Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16.
480. Okurasho, kondankai mokeru kento; Raishun, giron matomeru [MOF Sets Up Study
Group; Debate to be Settled Next Spring], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 15, 1994, at 7; Kaoru
Morishita, Defiant Small Banks Suddenly Big on New Products, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 28, 1994,
at 19 [hereinafter Defiant Small Banks]. An official in MOF's Banking Bureau publicly
stated that MOF was not in a position to judge whether the banks' products were right
or wrong. Id.; Lottery Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16.
481. Lottery Bank Accounts, supra note 414, at 16. "The Ministry of Finance, which
previously insisted on approving each new financial product, is in the unaccustomed
role in today's partially deregulated climate of letting events run their course." Defiant
Small Banks, supra note 480, at 19. "Under the newly enacted law (the APL), ministries
must provide written explanation for any instance of administrative guidance. MOF
could not impose any penalty on Jonan." Iwasa, supra note 477, at 6. Other banks
denounced Jonan's move because they felt Jonan threatened the financial sector, with
the specter of rampant competition. Minoru Nakamura, Lies, Damned Lies, & Financial
Liberalization, ToKYo Bus. TODAY, Mar. 1995, at 12 [hereinafter Financial Liberalization].
The National Society of Shinkin Banks, the major trade association for credit associa-
tions, like the Jonan Shinkin Bank, initially denounced Jonan's move. Defiant Small
Banks, supra note 480, at 19. AfterJapan's Fair Trade Commission intimated the soci-
ety's position could violate the Japanese monopoly statute, however, numerous other
banks followed Jonan. Tatsuya Inoue, Banks Offer Gft Lotteries as Competition Goes Bare
Knuckle, NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 18, 1995, at 12 [hereinafter Banks Go Bare Knuckle]. A
survey of shinkin banks revealed that 60% ofJapan's shinkin banks are offering or plan
to offer lottery accounts between November 1995 and March 1996. Id. Another expla-
nation for Jonan's successful move is that the bank was relatively small and in good
financial shape. Hirakawa, supra note 199. The bank, therefore, had the confidence to
challenge the status quo. Id.
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Some commentators felt that only small, financially sound
banks would have the courage to do what Jonan Bank did.48
However, Sumitomo and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, two of Japan's largest
commercial banks, recently began offering similar promotional
giveaways that include cash prizes.483 In addition, some broker.-
age firms are luring new investors with lotteries that were effec-
tively banned until the APL's start date.484
3. U.S.-Japan Trade Measures Incorporate The APL
The APL represented one issue discussed in recent bilateral
market access negotiations within the ongoing Framework Talks
between the United States andJapan.485 Agreements reached in
two rounds of negotiations confirm the applicability of the APL
to the insurance and financial services sectors in Japan.486 The
U.S. Government and U.S. businesses expect that these two
agreements may enhance the impact of the APL.48 7
a. Japan-U.S. Measures Regarding Insurance
On October 1, 1994, Japan and the United States signed an
agreement regarding the Japanese insurance market. 488 The
Agreement focused on market access and sought to lower ex-.
482. Hirakawa, supra note 199.
483. Banks Go Bare Knuckle, supra note 481, at 12. Two of Japan's largest banks,
Sumitomo Bank and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, recently started offering lottery based accounts
and prizes. Id.
484. Id. "Some brokerages are also trying to lure new investors with lotteries that
effectively had been banned until last year. Authorities feared that tacking chance onto
deposits or investments would promote ungentlemanly competition among financial
houses." Id. Thus far, the Big Four brokerage firms: (1) Nomura Securities Co.; (2)
Yamaichi Securities Co.; (3) Daiwa Securities Co.; and (4) Nikko Securities Co. have not
offered such products. Id. In a 1994 newspaper article regarding claims thatJapanese
regulators favor foreign finance firms and force domestic firms to rigidly comply with
administrative guidance, a Big Four brokerage official recently commented that "Japa..
nese brokerage houses dare not resort to legal measures, including the Administrative
Procedure Law, which draws clear lines between written rules and administrative gui-
dance." Kyoko Imagawa, Japan Brokerages Cry Foul, Claim Regulators Favor Foreign Houses,
Ni,,Ei WKY., Dec. 19, 1994, at 24. The Big Four brokerage official added that "[i]f we
ask for any stipulations, our good relations with government officials will come to an
end." Id.
485. Goodman, supra note 302; Radin, supra note 90.
486. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 666; Financial Services Measures,
supra note 419, at 626-27.
487. Goodman, supra note 302; Radin, supra note 90.
488. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 661.
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isting market barriers.489 Specifically, the Japan-U.S. Measures
Regarding Insurance490 ("Insurance Measures") addressed the
lack of transparency and poor procedural protections that char-
acterize Japan's insurance sector.49' Both governments wel-
comed the enactment of the APL by the Japanese Diet.492 The
two governments supported the APL's purpose of ensuring fair-
ness and transparency in administrative processes, protecting the
rights of Japanese citizens, and establishing generally applicable
procedures regarding dispositions, administrative guidance, and
applications.4 93  The Japanese Government stated that imple-
mentation of the APL with respect to the insurance sector would
be completed by November 1994.194
The Japanese Government confirmed that it would take
other necessary actions to bring administrative processes in the
insurance sector into conformity with the APL.495 Specifically,
the Japanese Government would compile and publish standards
regarding licensing to provide insurance and approval for new
products and rates unless it caused undue hindrance to adminis-
tration.4 96 In addition, pursuant to the APL, the Insurance
Measures stipulated that oral administrative guidance would be
offered in writing upon request unless it would cause undue
problems to the particular agency.497 The Insurance Measures
489. Id. at 661; Yasushi Kanzaki, Nichibei hokatsu kyogi ni okeru hoken bunya kyogi de no
kechaku no gaiyo [Outline of the Conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Framework Talks in the Insurance
Sector], SHOjI HOMU, Dec. 5, 1994, at 7.
490. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 661.
491. Kanzaki, supra note 489, at 9-10 (noting that Insurance Measures address lack
of transparency and poor procedural guarantees in financial sector regulatory process).
492. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 666.
493. Id.
494. Kanzaki, supra note 489, at 10; Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 666.
According to the agreement:
Measures referencing the Administrative Procedures Law ... will be imple-
mented according to the Government-wide schedule for implementation of
that law. The Government of Japan has explained to the Government of the
United States that implementation of this law with respect to the insurance
sector currently is expected by November 1994.
Id.
495. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 666; Kanzaki, supra note 489, at 10.
496. Insurance Measures, supra note 419, at 666. "Standards relating to licensing
to provide insurance and approval of new products and rates will be compiled, pub-
lished and made available to the public, unless it causes undue hindrance to administra-
tion." Id.
497. Id. "Administrative guidance that is delivered orally, upon request, will be
delivered in writing, unless it causes undue hindrance to administration." Id.
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also stated that when guidance is administered to multiple par-
ties for the same purpose, the agency should let the recipients
know in advance the elements in common, thereby establishing
uniform standards of administrative guidance. 498
b. Japan-U.S. Measures Regarding Financial Services
In May 1995, Japan and the United States reached another
agreement within the ongoing Framework Talks.499 The United
States wanted fair treatment, equal access, and liberalization of
financial service markets in Japan. °° Seeking to liberalize Ja-
pan's financial markets, the Japan-U.S. Measures Regarding Fi-
nancial Services 5 1 ("Finance Measures") incorporated many of
the underlying principles of the APL, as well as much of the ac-
tual wording.502 The United States hoped that by incorporating
the APL, the Finance Measures would provide enforcement ca-
pabilities for non-Japanese firms.503
The Finance Measures emphasized transparency and proce-
dural protections from arbitrary regulatory processes. 504 The
United States expressed support for the applicability of the APL
to financial services, and the Japanese Government confirmed
498. Id. at 667. The undue hindrance exception applies to this Article as well. Id.
The Insurance Measures state that the "undue hindrance to administration" exception
is intended to be used only in exceptional cases. Id.
499. Goodman, supra note 302; Naoki Uemura, Nichibei kinyu saabisu kyogi kechaku
no gaiyo [Outline of the United States-Japan Talks Regarding Financial Services], SHojI HoMu,
Feb. 2, 1995, at 2; Nichibei kinyu saabisu kyogi no kechaku [Conclusion of the US.-Japan Fi-
nancial Services Talks], SHOjI HoMu, Jan. 25, 1995, at 39.
500. Goodman, supra note 302.
501. Financial Services Measures, supra note 419, at 617.
502. Id.; Radin, supra note 90. "The Government ofJapan confirms the applicabil-
ity of the provisions of the APL with regard to regulation, administrative measures, and
other actions affecting the market for financial services and products in Japan." Finan-
cial Services Measures, supra note 419, at 626.
503. Radin, supra note 90. U.S. firms may complain to the Treasury Department
which may seek Japanese compliance. Id. Mr. Radin saw the incorporation of the APL
into the Measures as a fundamental and straightforward attack on the use of bureau-
cratic power in Japan. Id. Mr. Radin sees great potential in the APL because of the
law's provisions addressing specific characteristics of the way markets have historically
been regulated in Japan. Id.
504. Financial Services Measures, supra note 419, at 626. The respective Govern-
ments "confirm that fair and transparent regulations and policies governing the activi-
ties of financial services suppliers are important in facilitating both the access of foreign
financial services suppliers to, and their operations in, domestic markets. Both Govern-
ments reiterate their commitments to continuing to promote transparency in financial
services." Id.
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the APL's applicability regarding licensing, administrative ac-
tions, and other actions affecting financial services markets. 5 5
As in the earlier Insurance Measures, the Finance Measures' pro-
visions regarding transparency and procedural fairness in finan-
cial services markets stipulated the same principles found in the
APL's provisions. 0 6
III. THE APL IS A POSITIVE FIRST STEP TOWARD FAIRNESS
AD TRANSPARENCY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
1N JAPAN
The Japanese APL signifies Japan's efforts to formalize its
regulatory process and eliminate criticism that Japan's markets
are closed.50 7 The unpredictability inherent in Japan's informal
regulatory system 508 impedes economic growth and provides in-
centive for domestic and foreign companies alike to bypass Ja-
pan and invest overseas.-"' The APL attempts to reverse this hol-
lowing out by inhibiting the use of arbitrary and non-transparent
administrative guidance and formalizing regulatory methods in
areas regarding applications, dispositions, and notifications.510
A general decline in bureaucratic prestige and power since the
505. Id.; Interview with Ministry of Finance Official, Tokyo, Japan, August 1995
[hereinafter MOF Official]; Hokatsu kyogi yotsu no pointo; Okurasho, seika o kyocho; Ichiba
kankeisha ha hiyayaku [Four Points Agreed Upon in Financial Services Negotiations; Ministy of
Finance Emphasizes Results, But Markets are Cool], NIHON KEIzAi SHIMBUN, Jan. 17, 1995, at
5.
506. Financial Services Measures, supra note 419, at 626-28. The Financial Meas-
ures focus on establishing and publishing licensing and approval standards of financial
activities. Id. at 626. Recipients of adverse dispositions must receive notice, as well as a
written explanation for the disposition, except in cases of "extraordinary administrative
inconvenience." Id. With regard to administrative guidance, the Measures emphasize
that guidance must be within the agency's jurisdiction, that compliance is voluntary,
and that oral guidance will be given in writing upon request. Id. at 627.
507. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (indicating criticism that Japan's
markets are closed to new market entrants because of non-transparent regulatory meth-
ods).
508. See supra notes 161-286 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrariness and
lack of transparency in administrative guidance process).
509. Shibaita & Fukuei, supra note 14, at 4; see Hollowing Out Japan's Financial Mar-
kets, supra note 229, at 67 (reporting concern in Japanese financial markets that busi-
ness is shifting to Singapore, London, and Hong Kong); supra notes 205, 229 and ac-
companying text (discussing shift of business overseas because of regulatory impedi-
ments).
510. See supra notes 329-414 (analyzing APL's provisions and effect of formalizing
Japanese regulatory system).
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early 1990's" supplements the APL's efforts to add trans-
parency to Japanese markets. Notwithstanding the impact of for-
malizing regulatory procedures and the decline in bureaucratic
influence, however, the APL fails to address key procedural inad-
equacies of the administrative guidance process.
A. Formalizing Rules and Procedures Represents Positive Reform of
Japan's Administrative Machinery
The APL clarifies Japan's administrative process by institut-
ing principles that emphasize the use of writings, 1 2 provide no-
tice to interested parties prior to administrative actions,513 and
require agencies to publicize generally applicable rules and pro-
cedures.514 Provisions regarding administrative guidance add
transparency and clarify the source and nature of guidance.1 5
The APL's principles are a good foundation on which to con-
struct a more formal regulatory system and inhibit arbitrary ad-
ministrative guidance. Cooperation by such national agencies as
MITI and MOF in complying with the APL signified acceptance
of the new law.516
1. The APL's Emphasis on the Use of Written Requests and
Responses Increases Clarity and Accountability in
Administrative Process
The APL's emphasis on the use of written requests and re-
sponses facilitates both clarity in administrative process and ac-
countability of bureaucratic agencies for their actions. Past reli-
511. See Buckley, supra note 194, at 12 (reporting sharp drop in favorable public
opinion toward Japan's bureaucracy); supra notes 203-06, 226-32 and accompanying
text (noting decline in prestige and influence of MITI and MOF in Japanese economy
since early 1990's).
512. See supra notes 342-49, 370-74, 397 and accompanying text (analyzing APL
provisions that stipulate use of written responses and requests in dealing with Japanese
administrative agencies).
513. See supra note 386-414 and accompanying text (analyzing APL's adverse dis-
position procedures that require notice prior to issuance of administrative disposition).
514. See supra notes 367-68, 392-96 and accompanying text (stipulating establish-
ment of clarified standards and procedures regarding applications and adverse disposi-
tions).
515. See supra notes 337-53 and accompanying text (discussing APL's provisions
that are designed to add transparency to administrative guidance process).
516. See supra notes 416, 421-54 and accompanying text (analyzing newly clarified
procedures promulgated by MITI and MOF designed to comport with APL's adverse
disposition hearing requirements).
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ance on oral guidance5 1 7 and the prevalence of informality"'
made it difficult for parties to discern proper procedures and
insulated the bureaucracy's control of the economy from any
legal challenge." 9 Reliance on writings may, therefore, improve
a party's chances of gaining judicial review of administrative ac-
tions. The APL stipulates that parties may request written confir-
mation of administrative actions, including administrative gui-
dance.520 Agencies also must provide written responses to in-
form applicants of the progress of their application, and when
denying applications, must provide a written explanation of the
necessary modifications or the reasons for the denial.52 ' By re-
quiring these actions, the APL adds written formality to the Japa-
nese regulatory system.
2. Requiring Prior Notice and the Opportunity to Respond to
Impending Dispositions Adds Fairness to the
Japanese Regulatory System
The APL emphasizes the issuance of prior notice and op-
portunities for parties to present statements and arguments on
their behalf.5 22 Absent notice requirements and the chance to
respond to impending adverse dispositions, a party could be
treated unfairly and receive notice only when their license was
revoked. Although the APL exempts rejected applications, 23
517. Kdderitzsch, supra note 148 (reporting that most administrative guidance is
oral); see supra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of oral guidance
in Japanese regulatory system).
518. See supra notes 70-129 and accompanying text (discussing informal institu-
tional arrangements that perpetuate regulatory rule by informal methods in Japan).
519. See supra notes 355-59 and accompanying text (discussing unpredictability
and arbitrariness that characterized Japanese regulatory system because of oral gui-
dance and uncodified standards); supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text (explain-
ing difficulty of gaining judicial review of informal government actions, including ad-
ministrative guidance).
520. APL art. 35(2), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). The guidance must be in writing
when requested except in cases of "extraordinary administrative inconvenience." Id.;
see supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text (discussing APL provision that provides
parties ability to request oral guidance in writing).
521. See supra notes 365-74 and accompanying text (analyzing APL's requirements
regarding publicized application criteria and notice requirements for non-conforming
applications).
522. See supra notes 387, 398-409 and accompanying text (discussing APL's re-
quirements for providing prior notice and opportunity to respond to pending adverse
disposition).
523. Sumo Wrestling, supra note 369, at 17. Rulings concerning applications are
exempted from the adverse disposition provisions. Id. There is, therefore, no legal
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the law requires agencies to provide notice to parties and an op-
portunity to be heard prior to the issuance of an adverse disposi-
tion.524 Accordingly, this adds fairness to the workings of the
Japanese bureaucratic administration.
3. The Creation of Generally Applicable Standards and
Procedures Further Enhances Predictability in the
Japanese Regulatory System
The APL requests agencies to create and publicize generally
applicable rules and procedures in order to facilitate the applica-
tion and approval process. The law implores government agen-
cies to enact concrete standards and criteria forjudging the mer-
its of applications. 5 and for rendering adverse dispositions. 52 6
An MCA survey of the year after the enactment of the APL re-
ported that over ninety percent of dispositions relating to licens-
ing approvals were judged by standard review criteria,527 and
standard time frames for review of applications were established
for eighty percent of application dispositions.52 8 Only twenty-
one percent of adverse dispositions regarding revocation of li-
censing approvals, however, were based on standard criteria.529
right to a hearing regarding a rejected application. Id. "Since so much business is
done on the basis of applications, this represents an enormous loophole in this area of
the law. Even where parties file applications to renew some permission, if the renewal is
denied, the adverse disposition procedures do not apply." Id. See supra notes 400-03
and accompanying text (discussing exemption of rejected applications from APL's ad-
verse disposition hearing procedures).
524. See supra notes 387, 398, 404-09 and accompanying text (describing APL's
requirements to provide parties opportunity to present arguments on their behalf
either in formal hearing or in writing before agency renders adverse dispositions).
525. See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text (analyzing APL provisions re-
questing government agencies to enact and publicize standards for judging applica-
tions).
526. See supra notes 393-97 and accompanying text (requiring government agen-
cies to create and make public review standards for determining when to issue adverse
dispositions).
527. Kyoninka no kyu wari ni shinsa kijun settei [Examination Criteria Established for
90% of Licensing Approvals], NIHON KEIzAi SHIMBUN, Oct. 1, 1995, at 2. Of 4614 licens-
ing approval dispositions rendered in the first six months following the APL's enact-
ment, 4168, or 90.3%, were judged based on standard review criteria. Id. The difficulty
of creating standard review criteria was cited as the reason why criteria were not estab-
lished for the remaining 9.7%. Id.
528. See id. (reporting that standard review time frames were established for 80%
of application procedures in 1995 MCA survey).
529. See id. (reporting that 79% of adverse dispositions that involved retraction of
licensing approvals were not based on standard criteria).
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Access to standardized review criteria improves predictability
and efficiency because parties can discern and perform the steps
necessary to gain approval.
4. Formalizing the Administrative Guidance Process Protects
Businesses From Arbitrary Application of
Administrative Guidance
The APL addresses the practice of purposefully keeping
vague the contents, purpose, and relevant ministry involved with
administrative guidance.13 0 The APL emphasizes the voluntary
nature of administrative guidance5 31 and seeks fair treatment of
parties that refuse compliance with guidance.532 Moreover, the
law requires government agencies to issue guidance only within
their jurisdiction 533 and put guidance in writing when re-
quested. 34  Formalizing administrative guidance curtails,5 5
530. K6dderitzsch, supra note 148, at 128. K6dderitzsch notes that:
Having to put in writing the content of administrative guidance will undoubt-
edly force the administrative body to think through the rationale and legal
implications of its request. However, part of the success of administrative gui-
dance has been the process of give-and-take between the administration and
an addressee and the blurring of legal boundaries. The impact of art. 35 on
the administrative style in Japan will essentially depend on whether the ad-
dressee will have either the interest or the courage to request a written state-
ment.
Id.; see supra note 345 and accompanying text (analyzing APL's provisions stipulating
disclosure of purpose, content, and ministry responsible for issuance of administrative
guidance)
531. See Sumo Wrestling, supra note 369, at 18 (noting that APL indicates compli-
ance with administrative guidance "should only occur on the basis of truly voluntary
choice by the concerned parties"); see supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing APL's emphasis that compliance with administrative guidance is voluntary and
non-complying parties may note be treated disadvantageously or pressured into compli-
ance).
532. Boling, supra note 7, at 15 (reporting that APL stipulates that when agency
issues guidance "with respect to an application (for example, seeking the withdrawal of
an application or alteration of its contents), it must make efforts not to hamper the
individual's right to choose not to comply with such guidance"); see supra notes 351-53
and accompanying text (emphasizing voluntary nature of compliance with guidance
and that refusal to comply should not disadvantageously affect parties).
533. See supra note 344 and accompanying text (discussing APL provision that re-
stricts agencies' administrative guidance to issues that fall under their jurisdiction,
thereby banning extra-legal or non-statutory use of administrative guidance).
534. See supra note 347-48 and accompanying text (discussing burden on individu-
als to solicit written guidance and limitations of APL provision that does not provide
written explanations of guidance for "on the spot" guidance or when issuing written
guidance causes "extraordinary administrative inconvenience").
535. Gyosei Shido nao Futomei; Shiko kara Ichinen Gyosei Tetsuzuki Ho [Administrative
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therefore, arbitrary enforcement of a ministry's guidance and fa-
cilitates companies' efforts to change inefficient business prac-
tices and improve competitiveness.536
B. A General Decline in the Power of Japan's Economic Bureaucracy
Supplements Japan's Attempt, With the APL, to Deregulate
and Improve Transparency in the Japanese
Economy
A general decline in the economic bureaucracy's influ-
ence537 supplements the APL's efficacy and provides companies
more leverage in their relations with government agencies. Crit-
icism regarding securities55 8 and banking scandals539 and the
hollowing out of Japan's financial markets540 increasingly pres-
Guidance: Guidelines Still Remain Non-Transparent; One Year after Enforcement of Administra-
tive Procedures Law], ASAHI SHIMBUN, Dec. 21, 1995, at 4 [hereinafter Guidelines Remain
Non-Transparent] (reporting incident of propane gas supplier, with Keidanren's support,
forcing regional MITI office to retract guidance regarding MITI's requirement that
parties submit documentation of negotiations with competitors when applying to ex-
pand service area). Only few such cases, however, were successful. Id. Keidanren was
consulted in 21 cases during the APL's first year of enforcement, five of which were
successful. Id. See supra notes 460-76 and accompanying text (analyzing incident in-
volving MITI, propane gas company, and Keidanren, where Keidanren supported gas
company in challenging MITI's administrative guidance, and ultimately forced MITI to
retract its guidance and approve gas company's application to expand its service area).
536. See supra notes 477-84 and accompanying text (discussing MOF's tentative re-
action to banks' offering previously banned lottery bank accounts in order to improve
competitiveness). Jonan Shinkin Bank, the first to offer the lottery accounts, made
US$1 billion in just twenty working days. Banks Go Bare Knuckle, supra note 481, at 12.
Many ofJapan's banks, including Sumitomo and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, two of the largest, are
now "actively courting customers with lottery-connected deposit schemes that offer win-
ners cash prizes or gifts." Id. Brokerage firms in Japan have begun to offer similar
products now that the effective ban on such products appears to have been lifted. Id.
537. Financial Liberalization, supra note 481, at 7. "Indications are that Japanese
bureaucrats have come to a historic turning point. This is evidenced by three factors: a
decline in bureaucrats' sense of duty to country, a weakening of their power over politi-
cians, and a decline in their ability to formulate effective economic policies." Id. See
supra notes 203-06, 226-32 and accompanying text (reporting decline in ministerial
influence in Japanese economy).
538. See supra notes 269-86 (analyzing role of MOF's guidance in illegal stock
losses compensation scandal, where MOF issued guidance for securities firms to quickly
close out certain accounts, and MOF's tacit authorization of illegal client compensation
in order to expedite closure).
539. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing banking scandals
involving jusen housing loan corporations and Daiwa Bank's New York Branch, blamed
on MOF's informal regulatory style and corrupting influence of amakudari system).
540. See Hirsh, supra note 231 (reporting flight of financial business from Japan to
overseas markets in Hong Kong, United States, and England).
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sure MOF to reform its informal and constrictive regulatory
style. MITI receives a double blow as industrial capacity contin-
ues to shift overseas541 and businesses maintain that they no
longer need MITI's assistance.542
1. International and Domestic Reproach of MOF's Regulatory
Style Will Loosen the Ministry's Grip on Financial
Markets
MOF's prestige has been tarnished as the Ministry struggles
with increasing pressure543 to reform the financial regulatory sys-
tem in the wake of securities and banking scandals. Moreover,
Japan's financial markets are hollowing out as foreign and do-
mestic firms seek to raise capital in more active foreign markets.
MOF cannot avoid, therefore, serious efforts to both lessen its
grip on the Japanese economy and reform its informal style of
governance into a market-driven structure able to function
within a more integrated international system.
a. Regulatory Reform in the Wake of Financial Scandals Will
Reduce MOF's Control Over Japan's Financial Sector
Financial scandal stimulated MOF to reform54 4 its regula-
541. See Overseas Production May Outpace Exports, supra note 205, at 3 (reporting that
overseas production by Japanese companies is on pace to surpass export production
from Japan for first time in history); Trading Companies, supra note 205, at 12 (describ-
ing hollowing out as business and industry shift overseas). Industry analysts point out
that Japanese manufacturing capacity is "hollowing out" or moving offshore. Trading
Companies, supra note 205, at 12.
542. See Telecom Wars, supra note 203, at 183 (indicating decline in corporate reli-
ance on MITI's guidance as Japanese firms attain levels of competitive maturity); supra
notes 203-04 and accompanying text (discussing global competitiveness of Japanese
businesses and decreased reliance on MITI's promotional guidance).
543. See Williams, supra note 231, at A10 (reporting decline in international and
domestic confidence in MOF's ability to govern Japanese economy in light of recent
slew of scandals); Yushiro Ikuyo, Jyapan Puremiamu ga Kokunai Kinri o Hikiageru Uapan
Premium Pulling Up Domestic Interest Rates], EKONOMISUTO, Nov. 14, 1995, at 28 (discuss-
ing negative effect of scandal at Daiwa Bank's New York Branch on domestic and inter-
national bank borrowing for Japanese banks); supra note 230, 298 and accompanying
text (reporting growing pressure on MOF to reform its informal, paternalistic regula-
tory style).
544. Ministry Reforms, supra note 93, at 2. MOF has been "rocked by a series of
scandals and, most recently, criticism of its handling of the bad-debt crisis caused by the
jusen housing-loan companies." Id. MOF is trying to internalize efforts to reform the
ministry in light of calls to disband MOF entirely. Id. See supra note 298 and accompa-
nying text (reporting plans by MOF to reform from informal to more market-oriented
regulatory methods).
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tory system in order to restore international confidence in the
Japanese financial system. Moreover, MOF recently censured
the influence-peddling practices of MOF-Tans. 45  Decreases in
corporate acceptance of amakudari officials into the ranks of pri-
vate companies546 and plans to extend the length of a ban on
employment of amakudari officials from two years to five years 47
will mitigate further the inherent abuses of MOF's informal reg-
ulatory style.
b. Hollowing Out of Japan's Financial Markets Pressures MOF
to Deregulate and Formalize the Domestic Regulatory
System
Japan's strongest financial firms and many foreign firms are
shifting overseas548 and MOF appears unable to cope with the
problem. The difficulty549 and expense 551 of offering financial
products in Japan causes firms to forego Japan and launch the
product overseas. Pressure to reverse the hollowing out trend
will lead MOF to continue deregulation551 and loosen its stran-
545. See supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text (discussing permanent employ-
ees of financial firms stationed at MOF in order to learn valuable information regard-
ing inspections of financial institutions and MOF's opinion on new products or serv-
ices); supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (reporting reform of MOF-Tan net-
work because of excessive entertainment costs and charges of collusive ties between
MOF-Tans and MOF officials).
546. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing decline in corporate
willingness to accept former bureaucrats into executive positions in private industry).
547. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing plans to reform
amakudari system because of suspected role of former bureaucrats in jusen housing loan
scandal and growing criticism of use of public funds for bail-out plan of bankrupt
jusen).
548. Hollowing Out Japan's Financial Markets, supra note 229, at 67 (reporting flight
of financial activity from Japan to Singapore, Hong Kong, London, and New York).
549. Hirakawa, supra note 199 (indicating need to gain MOF's approval before
launching new products or services); supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing
slowdown in MOF's approval process for innovative products and criticism of slow pace
of deregulation in financial markets).
550. See Hollowing Out Japan's Financial Markets, supra note 229, at 67 (discussing
exodus from Tokyo Exchange due to high costs of maintaining listing on Tokyo Stock
Exchange in light of low volume of shares being traded, 0.3% tax levied on value of
each share traded, and high brokerage commissions charged).
551. See Looser Foreign-Exchange Rules in Works: Easing of Control Proposed in Bid to
Stem Financial Hollowing Out, NirK i WKLY., Mar. 11, 1996, at 3 (reporting that MOF,
"bowing to international financial reality," is planning to "allow securities companies
and other corporations to engage in a broader range of foreign exchange-related trans-
actions."); Kiho Yokoyama, Lid on Public Offerings to be Lifted, NiKIEi Wv.v., Mar. 11,
1996, at 13 (indicating MOF's plans to allow listed companies free hand to offer new
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glehold on Japan's financial markets.
2. Corporate Self-Sufficiency and Hollowed Out Industries
Have Left MITI Without a Meaningful Role
The global competitiveness of Japanese companies and the
continuing shift of industry overseas correlates to a decline in
MITI's control over the manufacturing sector. Regulatory and
currency rate unpredictability push many firms, domestic and
foreign alike, to forego investing in Japan for more profitable
opportunities overseas. 2 This hollowing out will strengthen the
push for deregulation in Japan, as firms and therefore jobs con-
tinue to shift elsewhere.553
C. Despite the APL 's Good Intentions, the New Law Fails to Address
Fully the Procedural Inadequacies of the Administrative
Guidance Process
Enactment of the APL should not be the end goal in admin-
istrative reform. Reformers in Japan must view the principles
and procedures codifed by the APL as a starting point in deregu-
lating and formalizing the Japanese economy. Despite com-
mendable efforts, the current APL contains inadequacies that,
unless amended in the future, will allow the traditional regula-
tory style to persist.
1. Vague Wording and Legislative Loopholes Dampen the
APL's Efficacy
A major weakness of the APL is that it places great confi-
dence in the efforts of government agencies to establish clear
shares to public, helping market forces to work in long run by lifting artificial control
on supply); supra notes 477-84 and accompanying text (discussing MOF lifting ban on
lottery-based banking and securities products).
552. See e.g., Takai, supra note 206, at 8 (reporting hollowing effect of rapidly ris-
ing yen on Japanese manufacturing sector and relocation of firms to nearby Asian
countries); Tsukada, supra note 206, at 4 (reporting that many Japanese manufacturers
are at breaking point and are being forced to shift production overseas because of
uncertainty regarding yen rate andJapanese bureaucracy's inability to stabilize rate and
deregulate domestic market).
553. See Calder Testimony, supra note 14 (discussing effect of overregulation on
investment and employment in Japan). "After all, in a borderless global economy, con-
tinued overregulation will increasingly provoke both multinational and increasingly
even someJapanese firms to bypassJapan, and to migrate elsewhere - a prospect that
should exert its own unremitting pressure for reform." Id.
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and definite criteria for rendering various administrative actions.
This task, however, falls on individual agencies that have for
years perfected the art of obfuscation. Many of the APL's provi-
sions implore agencies only to strive or endeavor to enact crite-
ria for judging and rendering administrative acts.554 The APL's
aspirational language, therefore, leaves ample room for bureau-
cratic maneuvering.
The APL does not address certain key aspects of administra-
tive process. Agencies are not bound to adhere to the finding in
the presiding official's report following a formal hearing regard-
ing an adverse disposition. 555 Moreover, there are no guidelines
for granting a party's request to inspect the proceedings report
and presiding official's opinion.556 The adverse disposition
hearing procedures, furthermore, do not apply to rejected appli-
cations.557 The APL's relevance is severely constrained, there-
fore, because a party has recourse to formal hearings only in
cases where a license or approval is retracted in mid-stream or
when seeking a licensing renewal.
2. Japan's APL Extends Legal Imprimatur to Administrative
Guidance While Failing to Adequately Formalize the
Process
Administrative guidance represents an extra-legal regulatory
method 5 8 and establishing guidelines for its use in the APL au-
thorizes a technique that has no legal basis.559 The APL does
not require all guidance to be in writing and made public, with
554. See supra notes 369, 392-96 and accompanying text (indicating aspirational
wording of APL's provisions regarding application and adverse disposition standards).
555. See supra note 413 and accompanying text (discussing APL provision that re-
quires agencies to render dispositions "only after careful consideration of the contents
of the record.., and opinion of the presiding official entered in the report").
556. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (discussing party's right to request
inspection of report and opinion of presiding official). Regarding the record and re-
port of the formal hearing, the APL states that "parties... may demand inspection of
the records ... and the report." APL art. 24(4), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
557. See supra notes 399-403 and accompanying text (exempting rejected applica-
tions from hearing procedures).
558. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing informality and
flexibility of administrative guidance and absence of legal limits to constrain its use).
559. See Boling, supra note 7, at 16 (noting criticism of APL for codifying rather
than prohibiting administrative guidance process); supra note 342 and accompanying
text (discussing rationale of APL drafters for choosing to codify administrative guidance
and emphasize use of writings, rather than calling for total ban on administrative gui-
dance).
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exemptions clearly listed. The APL, instead, only requires gui-
dance to be issued in writing when requested by parties and at
the discretion of the agencies.5 60 Because the APL fails to for-
malize all uses of administrative guidance, agencies will continue
to informally pressure businesses to comply with administrative
goals.
3. The APL Lacks the Support of Legal Sanctions With Which
Businesses Can Challenge Administrative Guidance
The APL, designed to mitigate bureaucratic impediments,
acts as a double-edged sword. Business leaders welcome the new
law, but they also worry about who will have the conviction to
challenge government agencies. A party seeking to challenge or
ignore administrative guidance receives no assurance of outside
or legal help because the APL fails to establish the support of
legal sanctions. Keidanren's vow to support companies against
non-transparent administrative guidance is certainly beneficial,
however, only few cases have met with success. 561 Japanese busi-
nesses will be able to shake off current performance woes only
through innovation. While innovation is not normally the trade-
mark of Japan's conservative bureaucracy,562 companies have be-
gun to take advantage of tentative responses by ministries in the
wake of the APL.5 63
CONCLUSION
The arbitrary nature of regulatory procedures in Japan
caused troubling unpredictability for companies attempting to
enter or operate within the Japanese economy. The APL is one
560. APL art. 35(2), Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). Agencies do not have to comply
with requests where to do so would result in "extraordinary administrative inconven-
ience." Id. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (noting burden on parties to
request guidance in writing and absence of guarantees that ministries will comply).
561. Guidelines Remain Non-Transparent, supra note 535, at 4. Keidanren was con-
sulted on 21 cases during the first year after the APL went into effect. Id. Only five of
those cases were successful. Id. See supra notes 456-57, 467-76 and accompanying text
(discussing Keidanren's vow to support companies that receive administrative guidance
and phone hotline established for companies to call and report receipt of such gui-
dance).
562. See e.g., TATEWAKI, supra note 207, at 176 (discussing considerable slowdown
in approval process when companies seek innovative and unprecedented changes).
563. See supra notes 455-84 and accompanying text (discussing events after enact-
ment of APL in which companies have successfully challenged or ignore administrative
guidance).
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attempt by the Japanese Government to stem the tide of finan-
cial and manufacturing corporations shifting operations out of
Japan by improving the transparency of bureaucratic process.
The effectiveness of the APL, however, rests in the hands of the
business community. The law itself, with its inadequacies, can-
not be expected to change age-old practices of Japan's bureau-
crats overnight. In recognition of the APL's current weaknesses,
the business community must, therefore, take advantage of de-
clining bureaucratic influence and utilize the law to stand up to
the bureaucracy, or else Japan will continue to fall from its posi-
tion as a global economic power.
